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U.S. ARMY ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: 






This Joint Applied Project examined the acquisition workforce through the lens of 
The “New” Organization, a framework depicting modern organizational structural and 
process changes for improved performance.   A Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
team developed five alternative organizational design factors:  reliance on networks, flat 
(lean) hierarchy, flexible practices, building and embracing diversity, and capabilities for 
global and international efforts.  This effort examined 15 Army areas and programs to 
determine the extent to which structural changes are more or less reflective of the five 
characteristics.  A baseline was established and implications to various acquisition 
initiatives and projects were analyzed. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are 
offered for continuing development and evolution towards a more modern and responsive 
acquisition community.  Findings indicate that some Army acquisition projects appear to 
be shifting their structures and processes toward a greater use of networks, flatter/leaner 
structures and a more diverse workforce, including flexible recruiting and retention 
practices.   The objective was to ascertain how reflective various areas and programs are 
alongside five, overarching “new” organizational features, and to assist leaders and 
managers in continuing to adapt structures and processes into the 21st century.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This project focused on exploring how current and emerging trends might impact 
Army acquisition workforce performance, including options for improving performance.  
The analysis was conducted within the context of The “New” Organization, which 
includes the following characteristics: 1) reliance on networks, 2) application of flatter 
(leaner) structures, 3) incorporation of more flexible practices, 4) fostering of diversity, 
and 5) global and international trends.   
The research revealed the following concerning the acquisition workforce’s 
application in light of characteristics of The “New” Organization.  
• Many organizations within the Army and the acquisition workforce have 
already moved towards the use of networks for improving their effectiveness 
and efficiency.  
• There has been recognition throughout the Army of the need to rely on flatter, 
leaner structures where applicable.    
• The acquisition workforce leadership recognizes that flexible practices can be 
useful tools for workforce satisfaction. 
• The acquisition workforce leadership recognizes the need to account for 
greater diversity in accounting for the goals and objectives of the different 
generations of workforce employees. 
• The acquisition workforce leadership is placing more emphasis on developing 
effective cross-cultural communication skills to adapt to the global business 
environment.   
The acquisition workforce is an essential part of the overall Army workforce.  The 
research shows that much has been accomplished towards adapting to The “New” 
Organization construct yet more needs to be done. 
 xvi




This study describes challenges facing the U.S. Army acquisition workforce, 
including insufficient numbers of acquisition professionals and performance issues.  
Acquisition professionals are working within more complex and ambiguous 
circumstances with additional requirements for overseas deployments and more rapid 
fielding of capabilities, while the Army simultaneously adopts a Lean approach to 
streamline processes and improve performance.  This study examines the Army 
acquisition workforce through the lens of a concept called The “New” Organization 1 to 
determine the extent to which this workforce is reflective of this framework.  The “New” 
Organization proposes five characteristics: 1) reliance on networks, 2) application of 
flatter (leaner) structures, 3) incorporation of more flexible practices, 4) fostering 
diversity, and 5) global and international trends.  
A. PREFACE 
The project analyzed trends, factors and forces impacting the U.S. Army 
acquisition workforce, e.g., attrition and retirement rates; economic, political and 
retention factors; military mandates; and incorporating Lean processes.  Conclusions 
were drawn on possible structural causes, and recommendations were made on ways to 
replenish and improve Army acquisition workforce numbers and performance.  Nearly 
one third of federal employees will reach the typical retirement age between 55 and 57 
years of age by the end of 2012, including 58 percent of those now in supervisory roles, 
according to the Office of Personnel Management. Within the acquisition workforce, it is 
estimated that almost 50 percent of those employees could retire in the next five years.2  
While statistics seem to indicate that only 20 percent of the DoD Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (AT&L) workforce retires within one year of being eligible, 
even this loss of trained and experienced acquisition workforce members could adversely 
                                                 
1 Deborah Ancona et al., “The “New” Organization,” in Managing for the Future: Organizational 
Behavior and Processes, ed. Unknown (Boston, MA: South-Western College Publishing, 2001), 3-19. 
2 Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) Human Capital 
Strategic Plan, Version 3.0, June 2007, 10, fig. 4. 
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affect the Warfighter support mission.  While the recent U.S. and global stock market 
losses and financial crisis may cause potential retirees to postpone retirement decisions, 
the core issue of losing experienced personnel remains.  Emerging impacts on the 
acquisition workforce and the Army’s procurement capability continue to show signs of 
stress and degradation.  This project contributes to a more thorough understanding of 
personnel loss trends and continued erosion of acquisition-skilled human capital, 
including providing mitigation strategies and recommendations for improvement. 
One fact is that the Army acquisition workforce has been downsized to a smaller 
force structure since the mid-1990s, yet overall workload requirements continue 
unabated.  A generally accepted perception is that participation in two ongoing wars 
increases requirements and adds complexity.  Various economic stimulus plans 
(2008/2009) also may likely contain provisions ensuring oversight over a massive 
infusion of contracts, state grants and other measures.  Interviews with acquisition 
workforce specialists revealed that this emerging long-term mandate will further 
overburden the defense acquisition system charged with managing and overseeing new 
requirements.   
The Army is faced with a multitude of strategic issues, many of which are 
predicated on providing important products to Warfighters operating in diverse global 
environments.  Issues facing Army acquisition leaders include determining the right size 
of the workforce, aligning that workforce with shifting program contracting and 
procurement needs, and developing and applying new technology while meeting high 
OPTEMPO requirements.  Additionally, Army leaders are learning how to apply Lean, 
Six Sigma and risk management practices gleaned primarily from private industry. 
Some strategic issues appear to require greater urgency than others, e.g., 
implementing a new pay for performance system, National Security Personnel System 
(NSPS), which is not yet fully understood by portions of management and the workforce.  
At a minimum, NSPS appears to be inconsistently applied throughout the workforce, thus 
generating real and perceived inequity issues.  An ongoing challenge continues to be 
integrating various sub-cultures and work ethics that may be at the heart of improving 
relationships among uniformed, civilian and private industry partners, each often 
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operating under different regulations and practices.  Also discussed in the study is the 
overall aging of the U.S. workforce and the unintended outcomes of insufficient 
succession planning.  Substantial retirements could easily lead to severe losses in 
institutional knowledge.   Army acquisition leaders may need to increase efforts and 
methods to recruit personnel at various needed levels, including aligning of necessary 
training.  Other areas explored include revising and improving personnel policies such as 
telework and flexible schedules, outsourcing options, and using a wider array of intrinsic 
and extrinsic incentives tailored to different personnel in domestic and deployment 
locations. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research reviewed, described and analyzed the status of the U.S. Army 
acquisition workforce from 2003-2008, in terms of current and future issues facing the 
acquisition workforce.  Potential areas for improvement are offered to assist acquisition 
leaders and managers in understanding underlying problem areas while formulating and 
implementing ways of ensuring mid- and long-term performance. 
In framing this discussion, The “New” Organization construct was employed as it 
is comprehensive, is a useful tool for examining organizations, and has gained credibility 
among management scholars.  We believe this study reflects the first identified use of this 
construct to a military application.  Modern organizations seem to increasingly value a 
flatter workforce structure, able to respond more quickly to increasingly diverse 
stakeholders.  The use of cross-functional and self-managed teams also appears to have 
increased.  Almost all organizations must now compete, communicate and operate within 
a fast-moving, interconnected global economy. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the current status of U.S. Army acquisition in terms of personnel loss and 
degradation of associated, required and emerging capabilities, i.e., what is the 
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relationship between characteristics of The “New” Organization and the design, 
functioning and performance of Army acquisition?   
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What are the implications of change on the acquisition workforce?  
• What are the emerging role and impacts of Lean processes in Army 
acquisition?   
• What are the implications of The “New” Organization on the future 
strategy for mitigating personnel losses and improving acquisition 
performance? 
• How can components of The “New” Organization assist in:  
o Retaining experienced acquisition workforce personnel? 
o Attracting new, entry level personnel into the acquisition 
workforce? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of data collection included a range of quantitative and qualitative 
sources internal and external to the Army acquisition workforce.  Data was drawn from 
the DoD’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) Human Capital Strategic Plan 
(v 3.0), Congressional testimony, the United States Office of Personnel Management’s 
Strategic and Operational Plan (2006–2010), Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports, relevant industry related articles and  DoD briefings concerning  the acquisition 
workforce.  
 Researchers also utilized Federal Times online weekly surveys over the past year.  
Federal Times surveys addressed many of the issues targeted in this research.  Times 
surveys provided corroborative information through Opinion-Editorial (OpEd) 
commentaries by nationally recognized subject matter experts, articles by leading 
journalists, and quotes provided from surveys of federal workers.  The Federal Times 
editor agreed to allow the surveys to be cited, with the understanding that the findings 
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reflected the overall readership.  They did not necessarily represent the acquisition 
workforce in particular, and he stated, “[p]ast questions related to [only] the acquisition 
workforce tended to generate a smaller response than other more universal topics such as 
the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), retirement, and telecommuting.”3  Incentives for retaining 
qualified acquisition workforce members are discussed.  Surveys were analyzed primarily 
for contextual reasons to as there was an assumption that the Army acquisition workforce 
was generally reflected in the data set along with a broad array of other federal agencies. 
This project focused on the Army acquisition workforce to explore how current 
and emerging trends might impact workforce performance, including options for 
improving performance.   
The analysis was conducted within the context of The “New” Organization, 
which includes the following characteristics: 
• Reliance on networks 
• Application of flatter (leaner) structures 
• Incorporation of more flexible practices  
• Fostering of diversity  
• Global and international trends  
Each characteristic is described, including potential relevance to the acquisition 
workforce, and an assessment of the degree to which the current acquisition workforce 
employs or makes use of each characteristic will also be examined. 
Once the features of The “New” Organization and relevance to the acquisition 
workforce have been described, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations are offered 
for increasing reliance on these characteristics. 
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Figure 1.   Project Methodology (From: Hill and Gerstein, Authors, 2009) 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I describes the project and research questions, and Chapter II provides an 
overview of the current U.S. Army acquisition workforce during the time period 2003-
2008, and a foundational overview of the defining characteristics of The “New” 
Organization.  
Chapter III investigates current and strategic issues facing the Army acquisition 
workforce utilizing The “New” Organization construct.  The investigation incorporates a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative data and information. 
Chapter IV provides an assessment and analysis of the degree to which the current 
acquisition workforce may be transitioning towards greater efficiency (internal order) and 
effectiveness (external adaptation) juxtaposed with The “New” Organization framework 
in five areas:  
• Reliance on networks 
• Application of flatter (leaner) structures 
• Incorporation of more flexible practices  
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• Fostering of diversity  
• Global and international trends  
Chapter V details conclusions and recommendations for changing structure and 
processes to meet the needs and expectations of 21st century employees and stakeholders. 
 8
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. ACQUISITION WORKFORCE (2003-2008) 
According to the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), acquisition is defined as 
the conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, 
deployment, logistics support, modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, 
supplies, or services (including construction) to satisfy DoD needs, intended for use in, or 
in support of, military missions.4  A select workforce has been given the mission to 
perform these functions for the expressed purpose of supporting the full range of 
operational and organizational missions within DoD.  This includes providing combat 
capabilities to Soldiers, Seaman, Airmen and Marines as well as support for the 
installations where they live and train. 
To this end, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, (DAWIA) 
P.L. 101–510, codified in 10 U.S.C. §1701–1764 and subsequent amendments recognized 
acquisition as a multidisciplinary career field and required DOD to establish education 
and training standards, requirements, and courses for the civilian and military workforce.5  
The DAWIA count used today to account for the DoD acquisition workforce is 
comprised of thirteen functional areas including auditing; business, cost estimating, and 
financial management; contracting; facilities engineering; industrial/contract property 
management; information technology; life cycle logistics; production, quality and 
manufacturing; program management; purchasing; systems planning, research, 
development, and engineering (SPRDE)-Science and Technology manager; SPRDE- 
 
                                                 
4
 C.B. Cochrane and G.J. Hagan, Glossary: Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 12th ed. (Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2005). 
5 A House Armed Services Committee study, “Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition 
Workforce,” May 8, 1990, lead to the creation of DAWIA. In FY04, extensive changes were made in the 
NDAA to DAWIA legislation; often referred to as DAWIA II. These amendments were made by Public 
Law 108-136, Chapter 87, November 24, 2003. In FY05, additional amendments in the NDAA for DAWIA 
were made by Public Law 108-375, Chapter 87, October 28, 2004. 
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systems engineering; and test and evaluation.6  DoD and the military services generally 
refer to their acquisition workforce as the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) 
workforce. 
As of September 30, 2007, this workforce had a total of 126,033 members—89 
percent civilian and 11 percent military.  Across DoD, the Services and agencies utilize 
slightly different workforce capability constructs which are germane to their career field 
mix, size, and military composition.  The Army has an acquisition workforce of 43,473, 
the Navy/USMC 41,177, and the Air Force 24,172. Of that total workforce, the military 
composition represents 3 percent, 10 percent, and 37 percent, respectively.7 As one can 
see from these numbers, the Army relies more heavily on its civilian workforce compared 
to the other services. 
Table 1.   The Defense Acquisition Workforce (From: DoD, 2007) 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce
Career Fields (13) ARMY NAVY/USMC AIR FORCE OTHER TOTAL
Auditing 0 0 0 3,556 3,556
Business, Cost Estimating, & 
Financial Management 3,877 1,817 1,488 205 7,387
Contracting 9,632 5,076 6,762 4,568 26,038
Facilities Engineering 933 3,440 4 17 4,394
Industrial/Contract Property 
Management 114 58 22 287 481
Information Technology 2,432 747 1,012 232 4,423
Life Cycle Logistics 6,545 4,219 1,700 140 12,604
Production, Quality & 
Manufacturing 2,083 1,960 326 3,995 8,364
Program Management 4,117 3,699 3,936 675 12,427
Purchasing 319 580 131 140 1,170
SPRDE - Science & Technology 
Manager 145 205 30 103 483
SPRDE - Systems Engineering 11,050 16,804 6,162 694 34,710
Test and Evaluation 2,135 2,549 2,592 143 7,419
Other 91 23 7 2,456 2,577
Total 43,473 41,177 24,172 17,211 126,033
As of 30 Sep 07
 
                                                 
6 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, section 814, Review of 
Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Study, June 2007, 3-6.  
7
 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, 2. 
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The focus of this study is on the civilian component of this workforce.  These 
civilians comprised the cohort that acquired the weapon systems that led to the end of the 
Cold War, enabled these systems’ life cycles to be extended and have actively supported 
many of the current contingency operation efforts around the globe over the past 30 
years.  Almost 50 percent of the AT&L workforce have over 20 years of experience 
making this group of professionals the most experienced segment of the Defense 
workforce.8  This AT&L workforce is also highly educated, with 74 percent of civilians 
possessing bachelors or advanced degrees.9      
Many experienced AT&L workforce personnel are becoming eligible for 
retirement.  In 2005, 76 percent of the DoD AT&L workforce was either in the Baby 
Boomer or older generation.  According to the AT&L Data Mart, retirement profiles 
indicate that 18 percent of the civilian acquisition workforce is now eligible for full 
retirement.  An additional 20 percent will become available within the next five years. 
(See the Appendix) While some RAND data seems to indicate that the AT&L civilian 
workforce retires at a slower rate than the overall DoD workforce,10 eventually DoD 
must ensure that qualified people are able to fill the positions that were previously 
occupied by this highly qualified workforce which will soon become vacant.     
This is not just an Army acquisition workforce issue.  It is estimated that by 2012, 
one-third of total federal workforce will be eligible to retire.  In some agencies it's 46 
percent (HUD and SBA).  In DoD it is 33 percent.  A recent report by the GAO projects 
that in the next three years (2009–2012), nearly two-thirds of career executives and 
almost half of other supervisors can retire from across the government.11 
 
 
                                                 
8
 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, 3.  
9 Ibid., 3. 
10
Ibid., 10.  
11
 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Older Workers: Enhanced Communication Among Federal 
Agencies Could Improve Strategies for Hiring and Retaining Experienced Workers (GAO Report No. 09-
206, 2009); 1. 
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The 2008–2009 global recession is causing many federal employees to delay 
retiring, thereby likely slowing the exodus somewhat. "Eventually baby boomers will 
leave the workforce and when they do, they will leave behind gaps in leadership, skills, 
and knowledge," the GAO warns.12 
Notwithstanding such educational and training institutions as the Defense 
Systems Management College (DSMC), the Army Management Engineering Training 
Agency (AMETA), and the Army’s Civilian Career Intern Program at the Red River 
Army Depot (RRAD), this civilian workforce was largely trained “on-the-job” with only 
modest formal training after entering the workforce.  Only after Congress enacted 
DAWIA in fiscal year 1991 has continuing education and training been infused into the 
personnel development with the civilian acquisition workforce.  In accordance with 
DAWIA, personnel must now be trained and managed to reach commensurate levels of 
education for the acquisition position.  At the same time, DoD mandated a standing up of 
a professional military acquisition component to the civilian acquisition workforce.  Prior 
to the implementation of DAWIA, the Army did have a uniformed acquisition corps with 
officer specialty codes 51 and 97 as designated acquisition specialties.  In addition, this 
workforce was created in a traditional hierarchical structure with many layers for 
managers and workers at the many headquarters, arsenals, depots and bases around the 
world.  Much of the geographic placement of these facilities was based on strategic 
requirements for maintaining forces and capabilities overseas, such as the 300,000 
personnel that were stationed in West Germany during the height of the Cold War.  While 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts have compressed the geographic 
footprint, many of the historical organizational structures of the workforce remain. 
While historical structures may be slow to change, generally accepted knowledge 
is that acquisition workload and complexity continue along an increasing trend.  In 
historic or traditional bureaucratic structures, managers directly supervised other 
government workers.  Now, DoD civilians and contract personnel are working side by 
side in many organizations doing many of the same tasks. Increasingly there is a blurring 
of the lines between inherently governmental functions and those being performed by 
                                                 
12
 GAO Report 09-206, 2. 
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contractor personnel.  In some cases, DoD personnel are being called upon to manage the 
work of contractors with increasingly fewer government civilians doing the actual work. 
Since the military has fielded automation capabilities down to the lowest levels, 
we have seen a great increase in capability for ordering parts, as well as developing 
common operational pictures (COP) for everything from enemy order of battle to 
equipment distribution and fielding plans.  This appears to have had positive impacts on 
effectiveness (external adaptation) and efficiency (internal order).  This automation has 
also allowed some built in testing (BIT) capabilities to be part of weapon systems 
components, allowing immediate notification of operational errors or faults.  This new 
capability now changes the personnel requirements for people who previously repaired 
and maintained the components to a need for personnel skilled in diagnosis and 
replacement of damaged components. 
Since 2003, the United States has been actively engaged in contingency 
operations, necessitating timely introduction of advanced weapon systems (unmanned 
vehicles), global logistics and asymmetric strategies and tactics.  Similarly, the Army 
acquisition workforce has seen a rise in both the complexity of procurement requirements 
and the speed with which products and services must be delivered to geographically 
dispersed U.S. and allied defense personnel.  The large, complex bureaucratic model may 
be appropriate for stable, mass production efforts (e.g., 45 years of Cold War), but may 
not be well-suited for responding to current asymmetric and irregular global conflicts. 
Therefore, while the overall goal of the acquisition workforce remains the same—
to support the Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines in the field and fleet—the 
requirements on the workforce have evolved over time. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE “NEW” ORGANIZATION 
The “New” Organization compares and contrasts classic or traditional 
organizational features with new features emerging in modern organizations. Some of the 
new features appear to be opposite from classic Weberian characteristics13 which arose 
                                                 
13 The German sociologist Max Weber was the first to identify a set of features systematically shared 
by modern large-scale public and private sector organizations. 
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following the 2nd industrial revolution and WWII, e.g., from hierarchical to flat 
organizational structures.  The classic machine bureaucracy model is still pervasive 
around the modern world (e.g., armies, navies, McDonalds and the postal services).  
These bureaus have many commonalities:   specialized, standardized and formalized job 
positions, with specified responsibilities and qualifications; control of employees through 
top-down formal hierarchies controlled by a clearly designated chain of command;   
distinct boundaries between functions; standardized training and training requirements 
for each career path.  This has unfortunately contributed to a commonly accepted view of 
being too-big and too-slow to adapt to the changing world around them, e.g., failure of 
large financial institutions, 2008–2009. 
The classic model was designed for predictability and reliability, and additional 
strengths, e.g., McDonalds creates virtually the same inexpensive dining experience at 
thousands of restaurants for millions of people every day.  The U.S. Postal Service 
delivers millions of letters to their proper destination in a timely fashion for low rates.   
Most of these types of organizations operate impartially, e.g., striving to promote 
employees based on merit or performance.  In general, as employees continue in a 
specialized job, they deepen their expertise and become more efficient, thereby lowering 
costs and increasing volume (experience/learning curve).  Decision-making authority is 
centralized top-down with many supervisors typically needed to handle inevitable 
conflicts among separate functions or silos vying for resources.  
As external environmental factors change, organizational strengths can become 
weaknesses, e.g., information taking too long to travel up the hierarchy to decision 
makers, and decisions taking too long to travel back down the layered chain of command. 
As an example, if the decision to acquire parts that are long lead items is delayed, two 
outcomes may occur.  The parts may not be available when needed or the parts could 
have been ordered in anticipation of a positive decision that perhaps never comes. 
The “New” Organization construct has five characteristics through which the 
Army acquisition workforce of today will be examined.  Certainly, other frameworks 
could be employed for examining the workforce.  We have chosen the structure of The 
“New” Organization as it is a comprehensive and useful tool for examining 
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organizations, and has gained credibility among many management scholars.  
Organizations have increasingly seen the value of a workforce which can operate 
effectively under a flatter, more streamlined structure, utilizing more diverse groups of 
stakeholders within a team-based architecture.  Organizations have also been tasked to be 
more responsive to the changing environment throughout the global economy. 
The “New” Organization characteristics are: (1) reliance on networks, (2) 
application of flatter (leaner) structures, (3) incorporation of more flexible practices to 
meet the challenges of multitasking, (4) fostering of diversity, and (5) global and 
international trends. 
1. Reliance on Networks 
The first characteristic of the new model is a reliance on networks including 
several unique components.  Cross-functional teams bring together personnel 
knowledgeable in multiple areas who can collaborate more effectively by sharing 
information across and outside the organization.  This structure brings together the best 
ideas from across all stakeholders, encouraging collaboration across multiple disciplines.  
The substantial use of teams can exemplify a fundamental shift in level-of-analysis from 
individuals to teams. 
Another component is the development of new concepts for how an organization 
interacts with its environment.  One specific example is the development of essential 
relationships with suppliers.  Mature and productive networking could also include 
opening up a process whereby functional area individuals communicate directly with 
external functional area customers and stakeholders.   
Finally, the Information Age provides unique opportunities for digital 
communications.  Information and data can also be electronically networked increasing 
interagency speed, coordination and organizational learning.  Virtual communities can be 
brought together across vast geographic distances at a moment’s notice to solve difficult 
problems or collaborate on key issues.   
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2. Application of Flatter (Leaner) Hierarchy 
Another distinct characteristic of The “New” Organization is a flattening of the 
organizational hierarchy.  A flat structure usually means fewer layers of management, 
quicker response times, and decentralization or the pushing of decision making down to 
lower level personnel.  Flexibility and responsiveness are facilitated as the hierarchy 
eliminates layers, minimizes stove-piping, and allows greater local control.  
Information technology allows for removing unnecessary management layers that 
were merely serving to move information up the chain from where the work was being 
done to the headquarters. 
Flattening organizations also implies reducing or streamlining personnel 
previously needed for a particular process, again reflective of improved efficiencies.   
This explains the theory behind Lean methodology, i.e., eliminating non-core functions 
that do not add value to productivity.   
3. Incorporation of Flexible Practices 
The well defined, rigid rules and processes representative of the old (bureaucratic) 
organizational model may not fit  a more current, aware and educated workforce.  Greater 
flexibility and quality of life is expected from many employees, particularly younger 
members now entering the workforce.   
The need for flexibility may reflect more varied lifestyles and more capable 
technology allowing employees to work from home.  To the extent that the U.S. is 
becoming more diverse, so too must an increasingly diverse workforce be recruited and 
retained.  The motivations and work ethics of Generation X (Gen X) and Generation Y 
(Gen Y) employees may be surprisingly different from Baby Boomers, hence requiring a 
wider array of managerial skills.  Flexible practices can be used as incentives to fit a 
changing workforce. 
4. Fostering of Diversity 
The new model also illustrates the realities of incorporating and integrating 
diversity throughout the organization.  The three previous features of the new model 
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reinforce the fourth: the need for The “New” Organization to accommodate a diversity of 
perspectives and approaches, career paths and incentive systems, people and policies 
within its boundaries and to respond to an increasingly diverse array of external 
constituencies and stakeholders.14  
An organization that respects and accommodates diversity in its workforce and 
practices may find itself better placed among its competition and stakeholders.   The 
workforce has changed and become more diverse as a growing number of women, 
minorities and diverse international personnel enter and leave organizations at different 
points in their career.   This more diverse workforce poses both additional challenges and 
a greater likelihood of creative approaches to problem identification, construction of 
alternatives and problem solving.  
Finally, organizations which operate under a flatter, more flexible type of 
management system may find they are able to network with organizations that operate 
along similar principles.  These organizations may function more effectively and reach a 
larger number of customers through the acceptance of diverse viewpoints, behavior and 
personnel. 
5. Global and International Trends 
Global environment trends will now significantly impact our development of 
human capital strategies and include: 1) The “globalization” or interdependence of 
governments and economies, 2) the proliferation of Web-enabled technologies which are 
opening up operations within more complex, information-rich, and technologically 
sophisticated environments, and 3) the shifting of highly skilled workers with technical 
degrees from the United States and Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe, India, 
and China.   
With globalization, those nations that best create, develop and enhance their 
human resource talents may be well-positioned to experience a competitive advantage, 
especially in technology areas. The United States has seen a decline in the number of 
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science and engineering doctoral degrees in the last ten years, due to foreign students 
who have chosen to continue their schooling in their native countries.  With an increased 
emphasis in Asian countries on science and engineering training and degrees, the number 
of foreign students who remain and work in the United States after completing advanced 
schooling has decreased.  
It is with this understanding of the five characteristics of The “New” 
Organization that an assessment of the degree to which the current Army acquisition 
workforce employs or makes use of each of these characteristics is discussed next.  
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III. TRENDS WITHIN THE ARMY ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
TOWARD THE “NEW” ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The vision of the Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (AT&L)] encompasses all aspects of force life cycle requirements from strategy 
to the field operations.  Figure 2 provides a short synopsis of the vision statement and 
details specified and implied requirements that dictate how the acquisition workforce 
intends to develop technology and tools to support Warfighters.  
 
The AT&L vision is to drive the capability to defeat any adversary on any battlefield. To achieve this, we need to 
create an inspired, high-performing, boundary-less organization that delivers. Each person must make a 
difference and actively participate in creation of a motivated, collaborative, and creative organization. We need 
to seek out new ideas and new ways of doing business.
We need to be prepared to question requirements and traditional processes. We need to ensure the Warfighter 
can operate and rely on our systems. We need to collaborate effectively across traditional boundaries. We 
need to see ourselves as part of a community or neighborhood that comes together as stakeholders around joint 
projects. We must make the enterprise succeed.
This vision is driven by America’s global strategic interests and by our need for strategic resilience and strategic 
awareness. The world economy and the terrorist threat dictate that America’s interests are truly global.
 
Figure 2.   DoD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) Vision Statement 
(From:  DoD, 2009) 
The former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Ken 
Krieg, stated in the introduction to the DoD’s AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan (v 
3.0),  
Our workforce today is highly experienced, well educated, and well 
trained.  However, we face very serious demographic challenges and 
potential talent shortages as we move to the future.  In this environment, 
we must have comprehensive enterprise and specific component human 
capital plans to mitigate these challenges.  If not effectively addressed, 
they will have a detrimental impact on the responsiveness and quality of 
our acquisition outcomes that support the national security mission.  Those 
organizations that identify, obtain, develop, and retain the right 
 
 20
humancapital talents in this rapidly changing and competitive environment 
will succeed.  Those that do not will fail.  In our business, we cannot 
afford to fail.15   
With these imperatives in mind, the acquisition workforce must be highly 
professional.  It must comprise well-trained and knowledgeable individuals capable of 
making key acquisition decisions with regard to Warfighter systems.    
B. RELIANCE ON NETWORKS 
Over the past decade, the DoD has continued to be increasingly reliant on 
networks for all applications, including the acquisition workforce.  
During the height of the Cold War and before the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reform Act of 1986, the Services individually determined requirements based on broad 
policy, strategic and resource guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD).  As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) grew more powerful by virtue of 
this capstone legislation, changes occurred which have fundamentally altered the way in 
which requirements are generated, how the systems and capabilities are acquired, and the 
players who now have a voice in this expanded system.  One major change was the use of 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) chaired by the Vice Chairman of the 
JCS (VCJCS) with its members the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the respective Services, senior 
members from OSD, and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).  This has led to 
outcomes where systems must demonstrate their application within the context of the 
Joint community prior to being resourced.  Essentially, one of the tasks of the JROC is to 
serve as a network of senior officials with the task to determine whether major weapon 
systems fit within the Joint architecture and therefore should be funded.  This task is 
formalized within the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.16 
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 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, iii. 
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 CJCSI 3170.01G, 1 March 2009,JCIDS Instruction.  The purpose of this instruction is to establish 
the policies for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The procedures 
established in the JCIDS support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying and assessing joint military capability needs, specific procedures 
for the operation of the JCIDS and for the development and staffing of JCIDS documents.  
 21
1. Cross-Functional Teams 
In the Army, this expansion of the concept of networks occurred when General 
Shinseki announced the Army’s Transformation in 1999.  The intent was to develop a 
networked system that linked Warfighters at all levels with the sustaining base in order to 
create a seamless organization wherein the front line Soldiers could receive the latest, 
advanced capabilities at the appropriate time and place.  Acquisition personnel, as part of 
the sustaining base, were a critical link in this intended enabled workforce.  This linkage 
was a physical and conceptual melding to build virtual communities that would link the 
operational and institutional parts of the Army as well as networking within each 
component.  
Networking of the Army occurs at multiple levels.  At the Army level, personnel 
work at distributed locations such as Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
schools and subordinate headquarters to develop requirements statements and concepts to 
be fielded as part of a warfighting system.  Once requirements have been established, 
system commands, labs, contractors and vendors tied together through contractual media 
and other agreements begin the process of developing capabilities to meet requirements.  
Testing and fielding put these capabilities in the hands of the Soldier, under the watchful 
eye of trained acquisition personnel, networked and working in unison from various 
locations around the world.  This was both the vision of the Army’s Transformation and 
the promise of the network.17      
An instructive example is the development and fielding of the initial Stryker 
vehicle to the brigade combat teams that went from concept to fielding in about 18 
months and into combat some four years later.   
Some conflicts and wars unfold slowly, allowing opponents to move men, 
weapons and other necessary resources into place over a protracted period of time.  In the 
current global political and military climate, incidents with the potential to develop into 
crises often erupt quickly.  Some incidents may be short in duration thereby requiring 
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 United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP), Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington D.C., April 10, 2002. 
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timely decisions and logistics movements.  It was into this environment that the Stryker 
vehicle was born. 
In October 1999, General Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the Army, announced a 
priority program to transform the Army into a force that could better meet future 
requirements to be both rapidly deployable and lethal. This Transformational Plan was 
designed to change the organizational structure of the Army in order to adapt to new 
challenges in the global environment. Two of the basic elements of this plan were the 
transformation of the Operational and Institutional parts of the Army.  For the operational 
Army, this entailed the development of self-sufficient modular combat brigade teams, 
containing the power of a tank battalion and able to be deployed by air within 96 hours 
anywhere in the world.  Additionally, these brigade combat teams would be used as the 
advance element, establishing and maintaining a presence until the rest of the force 
arrived, or as the main combat element depending on the conflict situation.  The Interim 
Armored Vehicle (IAV), renamed the Stryker vehicle, a lighter combat vehicle compared 
to the Army’s tanks, was designed to balance lethality, mobility, and survivability with the 
capabilities required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater 
footprint in order to enable these new combat brigade teams to meet their objectives.  
While the Stryker was based on the U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), 
the Army embarked upon a modernization program which expanded the basic LAV to 
include eleven different variants, each with different mission packages (infantry, anti-
tank, mortar, commander’s vehicle, medical evacuation, etc.).18  
The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an 
evaluation of the Stryker vehicle design, to include deployment of the brigade combat 
team and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats.  The 
act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the 
design was both operationally effective and suitable.19   
                                                 
18 Headquarters, Department of the Army Transformation Briefing to Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Command (CINCPAC), February 2001. 
19
 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Section 113, December 28, 2001, and P. 
L. 107-107. 
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The results of a December 2003 GAO report indicated that the operational 
evaluation of the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team provided the Army its first 
opportunity to exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker brigade as a whole.20  
While the GAO noted that there were some issues with training, design and equipment, 
many of those issues were inherent with a rapid deployment of a new design.  In 
preparation for deployment to Iraq in 2003, the Army mitigated most of the training 
issues.  The resolution of the design and equipment issues has been ongoing as the 
vehicles are utilized in response to the changing current contingency operations 
environments. 
The second part of the Army’s transformation entailed changes within the 
Institutional Army which included the Army acquisition workforce.  This envisioned 
change required a more responsive and forward leaning capability to support the 
Warfighter.  The intent was to streamline the acquisition process and provide better, more 
timely support across all the operational environments in which the force was deployed.  
The time to field weapons systems needed to be reduced to go from concept to design to 
fielding more rapidly.  Additionally, the acquisition workforce needed to have the 
capacity to support in forward locations in harsh environments.21     
With the development of a new Army organizational structure with new combat 
vehicle requirements, the acquisition workforce needed to be able to figure out how to 
operate to meet the requirements brought on by a quickly changing environment.  The 
Stryker vehicle was designed to meet the Army’s requirements for being rapidly 
deployable and combat capable.  In a span of six years, the Army announced its intention 
to create a new brigade, chose a vehicle, tested the operational concept, and deployed 
three brigades in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.22   In 2006, outgoing Military 
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Deputy (MILDEP) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (ASA (ALT)), LTG Yakovac, Jr. stated: 
Today, when you talk about our products that are really in the battlespace, 
it is now an integrated battlespace.  So we must do a better job of working 
together from the beginning—from requirements generation all the way 
through fielding. The Stryker program is an example of various PMs—not 
just PM Stryker—coming together to provide an integrated capability.  
Networking is absolutely a piece that needs everyone’s attention and they 
must understand it. So again, we have a capability that delivers what the 
Warfighter needs, but now it has been engineered to be both affordable 
and sustainable in the long run. It’s a community-wide challenge, and it’s 
one that we must continue to address.  We have a professional workforce 
that knows how to accomplish that.23   
A new networked acquisition process appeared to improve the links between 
combat developers, the acquisition workforce and the Warfighter. 
2. Organization Interacts with Environment 
Looking at the Future Combat System (FCS) provides useful lessons on how the 
acquisition workforce applied networks effectively.  In the case of the concept 
development, the FCS overarching concept was well-coordinated in a similar manner as 
described above for the Stryker family of systems.   A number of documents were 
produced that reflected the collaboration throughout the Army and particularly within the 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponents and schoolhouses.  This 
coordination was initially reflected in briefings such as The Objective Force Maneuver 
Unit of Action: FCS-Equipped Combat Battalion O&O24, but were later codified in such 
published documents as Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations25 and TRACOC Pamphlet 
(TP) 525–66, Force Operating Capabilities.26  The Army White Paper, Concepts for the 
                                                 
23 Hermes, Cynthia. “LTG Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr Reflects on Army Acquisition Changes and 
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25 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations.  Field Manual 3-0.  Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command, 2001. 
26 U.S. Department of the Army.  Force Operating Capabilities.  TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66.  Fort 
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Objective Force was written to provide the context for understanding Army 
Transformation and the objective force.27  Since the centerpiece of the objective force for 
major combat units was the FCS, the requirements for all aspects of the system from 
maneuver to support were documented and disseminated across the Army.    
The overarching concept that unified the Army towards the 18 + 1 + 1 construct 
was indeed well-coordinated throughout the force.  Individuals and organizations 
responsible for the early concept development began to codify the requirements for FCS 
in the program and the near-term budget submissions.  For example, in the FY01 
President’s Budget, Science and Technology (S&T) received a .6 percent real growth in 
topline from the previous year.28  This funding for S&T was directed towards the goal of 
a 20-ton family of vehicles to cover the range of envisioned operational missions using a 
common network focused on the Soldier.  The goal as stated by the Chief of Staff, Army, 
General Shinseki was to trade Information Age capabilities for armored protection to 
allow Soldiers and units to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively.29 
Many current enhancements on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan today are 
descendents of this early work.  The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) organizational 
structure is in many respects an early version of what the FCS unit organizational 
structure will look like, albeit with non-FCS vehicles.  Likewise, the vast improvements 
in the network clearly demonstrate how the acquisition community was able to translate a 
critical requirement for situational awareness from the FCS program and spin it forward 
to allow for early fielding of an FCS-like technology networking capability.30   
The Research and Development (R&D) that was ongoing on FCS also allowed for 
the individual systems and capabilities that had matured most quickly to be fielded early.  
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Examples include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unattended ground sensors and 
robotics that have been incorporated into the force.  While the Warfighter generated the 
requirements, it was the acquisition workforce that devised the spin-out approach that 
sped the transition of technologies, systems and capabilities to the field.    
After announcing his plan to transform the Army in October of 1999, General 
Shinseki initially turned to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
for their assistance in managing this highly technical concept.  DARPA and the Army 
already had an earlier initiative in which the defense industry was invited to offer ideas to 
help define operational and technology purposes for a future Army brigade.31  In 
February 2000, DARPA and the Army signed a collaborative Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) to develop FCS,32 leveraging the earlier DARPA/Army initiative.  
Through this partnership, the Army would be able to utilize the DARPA contracting 
instruments, which were more flexible than the Army’s.33   In May 2000, DARPA and 
the Army awarded four Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) for prototype programs to 
four industry teams to develop the first phase of FCS designs.34      
In March 2002, DARPA and the Army then chose two of the companies to be the 
Lead System Integrators (LSIs) for the concept and technology development phase of the 
FCS program and that decision was approved by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
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in 2003.35  The intended purpose of the LSI was to provide the systems engineering and 
management oversight throughout the development phases of the program, and be 
responsible for the delivery of the system-of-systems capable of engaging in net-centric 
warfare.36  The complexity of the total FCS program was seen to exceed the capabilities 
of the Army to manage this effort.  A GAO report says the following,  
In 2003, the Army contracted with an LSI for FCS because of the 
program’s ambitious goals and the Army’s belief that it did not have the 
capacity to manage the program. The original timeframe for FCS’s 
development was a shorter time frame than for an individual weapon 
system program, let alone a complex systems-of-systems program with a 
high number of immature technologies at program start. The Army 
realized that its compartmentalized workforce did not lend itself to the 
kind of crosscutting work that the FCS program would demand. The Army 
workforce also did not have the expertise needed to develop the FCS 
information network or enough people to support the program had it been 
organized into separate program offices. In contracting with the Boeing 
Company as LSI, the Army believed it found a management partner who 
could define and develop FCS and reach across the Army’s organizations. 
Boeing subcontracted with another company, Science Applications 
International Corporation, to assist with its responsibilities as LSI.37 
This same sentiment is described in even more direct terms in the Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal in which the authors state, “The concept’s [the LSI’s] two 
biggest advantages are its ability to fill in the personnel capability gap and subcontract 
management.”38  The authors go on to describe the advantages of the LSI approach as 
follows, “The primary value of using an LSI for the FCS program was in the area of 
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with an order of magnitude increase in the size and complexity of the program, created an 
immense capability gap between the amount of human capital available and what was 
required to execute the FCS program.”39  
Lieutenant General (R) Joseph Yakovac, Jr., objects to the GAO and Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal characterizations that the Army chose to utilize an LSI due to 
acquisition workforce or organizational issues.40  LTG Yakovac recognizes that 
“although there was much discussion about the ability of the acquisition workforce to 
properly manage and deliver FCS, that issue certainly was not the deciding factor in the 
selection of the LSI arrangement.”41  Rather, in email and phone discussions with him, he 
believes the LSI concept was utilized as the complexity of the FCS program became 
more evident.   FCS is unique in that in addition to the core program structure of 18 + 1 + 
1, FCS also included Complementary Systems, systems that were developed outside of 
the core FCS program but were necessary for the FCS systems to work together and/or to 
support the program.42  As the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began the 
process to determine, develop and analyze all the FCS requirements, the need for an LSI 
was identified.43   This unique contractual arrangement with an industry partner would 
provide the systems engineering and management oversight throughout the development 
phases of the program to integrate all the necessary capabilities the Warfighter demanded 
of FCS.  LTG Yakovac (R) states: 
The FCS requirement challenged Army acquisition professionals to think 
outside of the box; yet, they were forced to use the tools available to them 
to create an acquisition and management strategy to deliver a highly 
integrated system-of- systems.  By leveraging lessons learned and working 
closely with the warfighting community, the acquisition leaders of FCS 
initiated a unique contractual arrangement with a Lead Systems Integrator, 
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a program management organization based on tenets developed by all 
parties, and a test organization designed to validate the performance of 
individual components, systems, and ultimately, the system-of-systems.44 
One can see validity to both of these viewpoints concerning the use of an LSI in 
the FCS program.  The program was the most complex program the Army had ever 
undertaken.  Evidence suggests that the Army acquisition workforce was perceived as not 
being up to the task to manage such a large endeavor, necessitating the use of an LSI.   
However, it can also be argued that the use of an LSI flowed naturally from the 
DARPA/Army contract methodology that LTG(R) Yakovac references.  While this issue 
remains a point of contention, it is clear that contractor effort was used to replace some 
aspects normally provided by the acquisition workforce in the management of the FCS 
program. 
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) provides an example of a Joint system 
where the acquisition workforce utilizes the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) process to ensure system requirements are established 
across the Services to satisfy all Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).45  JTRS has 
evolved from simply replacing legacy radio systems across DoD to an integrated network 
of multiple radio systems across the entire frequency spectrum.   
For JTRS, the Services collaborated to arrive at a set of KPPs, and conducted 
testing of the systems in a Joint environment to correct any discrepancies.  The manner of 
decision making is to have all stakeholders participating in discussions of required 
capabilities such that all are heard and adjudicated.  This does not mean that all stated 
requirements will be incorporated, but rather that in a collaborative manner, all are 
considered.  Prior to management reorganization in 2005, this process proved to be 
somewhat lengthy, as key decisions were made by consensus, oftentimes making it 
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difficult to resolve inter-service differences involving requirements and funding.46  Under 
the revised JTRS Acquisition Governance Model, stakeholder disagreements are elevated 
to and decided by a JTRS Executive Council and later by a JTRS Board of Directors, if 
necessary.  This model decreases the time needed for acquisition decisions to be made 
while still coordinating with all DoD stakeholders.47 
3. Electronically Networked Information and Data  
The mission of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology ASA (ALT) is to equip and sustain the U.S. Army.  ASA (ALT)’s first 
responsibility is the production of best value capabilities provided to Warfighters where 
and when needed.  This electronic networking operates within two distinct systems.  The 
first is the manner in which acquisition professionals are networked in performing their 
daily duties.  The second is the manner in which the field or the fleet communicates 
requirements to the acquisition workforce.   
Electronic databases used by PMs, engineers, logisticians, cost analysts, financial 
managers, testers, contracting specialists, production and quality managers, etc. (i.e., the 
13 functional areas in acquisition) can be used to store and share data—cross-
functionally, and among the various stakeholders.  This clearly demonstrates the first 
example of this networking.  A recent Defense AT&L publication geared towards Human 
Capital issues provides an illustration of the various electronic collaboration websites 
available to the acquisition professional.  Examples include websites such as the Army 
Acquisition Support Center, the AT&L Knowledge Sharing System (AKSS), the Central 
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Community Connection (ACC), to name several.  These references allow for sharing 
information on topics from acquisition databases to managing training requirements to 
modeling and simulation.48   
The second example of electronically networked data demonstrates the linkage 
between the field and the acquisition workforce.  The Property Book Unit Supply 
Enhanced (PBUSE) system exemplifies how the acquisition workforce accomplishes this 
responsibility through the use of electronically networked information and data.  
IAW Army Regulation (AR) 700-142 and Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA 
PAM) 700–142, the Army uses the Total Package Fielding (TPF) process to provide units 
with material systems that are fully supportable, with minimum disruption to the unit’s 
day-to-day operations.  The TPF process is designed to ensure thorough coordination 
among the materiel developer, combat developer and the gaining Army commands and 
specific units in planning for the fielding of the system.  This planning includes the 
determination of all requirements up front, the funding and requisition of nearly all 
needed equipment, and the consolidation of any support items into unit-level packages. 
The TPF process also coordinates the distribution of the major system, the associated 
support items of equipment, and support packages, such as manuals or training, to a 
central staging site or to the gaining unit itself.    
Due to continued involvement in current contingency operations, the Army is 
seeking ways to bridge the capability gaps existing outside the traditional TPF process to 
better support forward deployed Warfighters.  This is being done by linking the 
acquisition workforce to the Warfighter through the field logisticians.  Two examples of 
this include the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) and the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and 
the PBUSE systems. 
The REF and the RFI are two Army initiatives that expeditiously provide the 
necessary equipment to the operational commanders in the field.  Often the accountability 
procedures of these two initiatives may not be fully documented as these initiatives are 
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designed to get the equipment to the Warfighter as soon as possible.  Many times there is 
a lack of an automated system interface between the acquisition community and the 
operational units.  Operational units may be co-located and equipment may be packaged 
for a specific forward operating base (FOB), not to the individual units who request the 
equipment.  Accountability within the Logistic Support Activity (LOGSA’s) Logistics 
Information Warehouse (LIW)49 of both the equipment items and the value of that 
equipment cannot be accurately matched to the specific units it was originally designated 
to go to, even though units may report the equipment as being on-hand.  PBUSE was 
designed to provide the missing accountability and asset availability for the REF and the 
RFI. 
PBUSE is the Army’s first web-based logistics property accountability system, 
providing the means to maintain accountable records for the Army’s inventory of 
property.  This encompasses over 14,855 users in both the Modification Table of 
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) 
for units within the Active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserves.50  
PBUSE is unique in that it interfaces with a number of other critical logistics systems, to 
include the LOGSA LIW, the Standard Army Retail Supply System, the Defense Finance 
and Accounting Service Corporate Database, the Army War Reserve Deployment 
System, the General Funds Enterprise Business System, the Central Issue Facility-
Installation Support Module, the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System, and 
Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier’s fielding application51.  PBUSE continuously 
supplies decisive management and financial accountability data to these systems in real-
time, thereby providing an accurate accountability chain.  
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In January 2007, the ASA (ALT) and the Army G-4 mandated that all PEO/PMs 
utilize the PBUSE to more accurately and efficiently facilitate the fielding of material to 
the field.  As PBUSE is a web-based application, no additional hardware is required to be 
purchased by the PEO/PMs.  As this is the same system the Warfighter utilizes to account 
for and track their equipment, PBUSE is able to provide Army-wide visibility of 
equipment status to any organization with access.  Through the use of this common 
software system, efficiencies can be obtained as duplication, stovepiped operations and 
associated training and maintenance costs are reduced.  Finally, units should be able to 
laterally transfer equipment electronically instead of by hardcopies.   
An example of information and data that is electronically networked and directly 
impacts on the acquisition workforce is the system by which parts are ordered in units 
through the Unit Level Logistics System - Ground (ULLS–Ground).  All services now 
have systems enabled by technology that link unit level clerks in the field directly to the 
sustaining base—including the suppliers of the parts and others in the acquisition 
workforce to resolve issues from parts requisitions to technical questions about 
equipment.  In this way, echelons dedicated to ordering parts and the associated 
personnel were able to be eliminated.  This was made possible through both technological 
enhancements in which networks were extended to the lowest levels, as well as the 
development of a virtual network which linked the disparate parts of the system.  
In many regards, the acquisition workforce has been modernized to take 
advantage of the networks, both physical and virtual, that have been made possible 
through technology, but more opportunities exist.  DOD and Army websites such as the 
Acquisition Community Connection (ACC) and the Army Knowledge Online (AKO), 
respectively, are becoming more interactive and allowing for on-line conversations and 
collaboration.  However, as we have seen in the non-DOD applications, there is an 
expansion of social networking sites that have the potential to change how business is 
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done in DOD.  New social networking sites such as Facebook52 and Twitter53 are 
allowing for even greater connectivity and broader data sharing across communities of 
interest.  While the ACC is more structured than Facebook or Twitter and provides a 
mechanism for users to share in acquisition discussions and interest areas, applications of 
these types are not incorporated as extensively throughout DOD.  One recent example of 
the Army’s expansion into the social networking area is their use of Facebook as it seeks 
to interest potential recruits.54  Perhaps it will always be a challenge to keep up with 
technology in a government workforce, especially in a maturing acquisition industry. 
C. APPLICATION OF FLATTER (LEANER) HIERARCHY 
The application of flatter (leaner) hierarchy actually relates to and flows from the 
previous characteristic, reliance on networks.  Developing virtual networks allows for 
flattening of the organizational structures, eliminating entire echelons in the process.  
While the Army has made significant inroads in discussing and incorporating Lean 
processes throughout the institutional and operational Army, much work remains to be 
done.   In 2006, the GAO reported that the DoD technology transition processes, the 
transitioning of mature technologies to the acquisition community for further 
development and demonstration, could be made stronger.  Specifically, the GAO 
recommended that DoD make greater use of tools, such as technology transition 
agreements, relationship managers, and metrics, to increase its ability to deliver mature 
technologies when needed, address transition issues more quickly, and to gauge the 
impact of their science and technology investments and lab processes. 55  To that end, in 
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March 2008, the Army implemented a Lean Six Sigma Black Belt project on technology 
transition to further capitalize on the GAO recommended processes.56 
The goals for this particular characteristic are listed below.57  As they relate 
directly to each other, the examples will illustrate this interaction.  
• Fewer layers of management, quicker response times, and a decentralization 
pushing decision making down to lower levels. 
• Removing unnecessary management layers 
• Reducing the personnel dedicated to a particular process or organizations thus 
creating significant efficiencies 
The question to be asked in implementing Lean in an organization is whether the 
functions performed are core processes.  If not, the theory goes, they should be 
eliminated (or outsourced) and the organizations or processes that performed these non-
essential functions eliminated.  The result would be leaner, more efficient 
organizations.58       
In the 2006 GAO Forum on Federal Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in 
the 21st Century, it was noted that too many layers of bureaucracy exist in the current 
acquisition process, and weapon systems may not reach Warfighters as expeditiously as 
possible.  This forum stated that potential improvements in technology, electronic 
procurement and commerce tools are needed to streamline and automate acquisition 
business processes, which in turn will also influence the types of skills the acquisition 
workforce will need in the future.59   The application of Lean methodologies could allow 
for the reduction of personnel dedicated to tasks, as well as reorganization within each of 
the areas to arrive at flatter, leaner organizations.   
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1. Quicker Response Times 
In light of the recommendations made in the 2007 Gansler report,60 Secretary of 
the Army Peter Geren directed the establishment of an Army Contracting Campaign Plan, 
a set of policies and procedures designed to position the Army to provide better 
acquisition and logistical support for future combat operations.  Secretary Geren also 
directed the restructuring of the way contracting was provided to the Warfighter and 
established a provisional contracting command on March 13, 2008.  The command was 
put in place to provide structure and strengthen the Army’s core competencies in 
contracting in support of the Warfighter, and prevent further instances of the fraud and 
abuse that were discovered in many of the Iraq war contracts.  Army contracting 
activities can acquire the technology, supplies, and services needed for Warfighters 
through a combination of responsive and innovative support.61  
On October 1, 2008, the Army formally recognized the Army Contracting 
Command (ACC) as a major subordinate unit within the Army Material Command 
(AMC), whose mission is to provide global contracting support to Warfighters through 
the full spectrum of military operations.   The ACC is structured as a two-star level 
command with two subordinate one-star level commands and will allow the leveraging of 
contracting assets across AMC.  Figure 3 provides a graphic depiction of this 
organization.  
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Figure 4.   ECC Organizational Chart (From: U.S. Army, 2009) 
As organized (Figure 4), the ECC provides dedicated, modular contracting 
support to its deployed units. The Army’s core of military commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers (NCO) trained as contingency contracting officers now make 
up the seven Contracting Support Brigades (CSBs).  These CSBs include embedded 
contract planners to coordinate contract requirements with the operational commanders in 
the field.  These CSBs are regionally aligned to the existing Army Service component 
command headquarters and provide the primary contracting support planning, advising 
and contingency contracting to the theater Army.  CSB’s are located in the United States 
and overseas supporting operations in Southwest Asia, Korea, Europe, Africa, the Pacific, 
South America, and North America.  The CSBs are made up of the subordinate units, 
Contingency Contracting Battalions (CCBs) and Contingency Contracting Teams 
(CCTs).    
As envisioned, Army expeditionary contracting capabilities will grow to seven 
CSBs, with eight Contingency Contracting Battalions (CCBs), 14 Senior Contingency 
Contracting Teams (SCCTs) and 69 Contingency Contracting Teams (CCTs).  
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Additionally, fielding of three CCBs and 83 SCCT/CCTs has already begun to provide 
the Reserve Component a surge capability for operational contracting.   
Currently within the active Army, there is one CSB and one CCB in support of 
the following Army Service Component Commands (ASCC),  
• U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) 
• U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) 
• U.S. Army South (USARSO) 
• U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) 
• U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) 
• U.S. Army Africa (AFRICOM) 
• Eighth Army (EUSA) 
The current requirement for the SCCTs is one per Army division.  The SCCTs are located 
with the: 
• 1st Armored Division, Wiesbaden Germany 
• 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas 
• 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas 
• 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, Korea 
• 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia 
• 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas 
• 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York 
• 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 
• 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
• 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky62 
 While this almost appears to be counter intuitive to a leaner structure, this 
configuration allows for contracting issues to be handled at a much lower level and 
facilitates a more “hands on” approach during the planning and coordination of 
contracting operations in-theater.   This structure provides a single source Army 
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contracting point of contact for the maneuver commander and facilitates the continued 
ability to meet contingency contracting commitments.  Front line units will have their 
own contracting elements forward deployed with them.  This modular concept of 
organization will afford contracting elements the ability to train and deploy as a unit and 
provide general support in order to better meet and address contingency operation 
requirements.  The ECC lives by the motto stated on many of their command briefings, 
“Need to be faster, more agile, less bureaucratic – Need to fight this every day.”  
 To gain the efficiencies (i.e., quicker response times) envisioned in this new 
command, additional emphasis will be required for training and educating this workforce.  
Therefore, to mitigate one of the challenges facing the ACC workforce as it continues to 
grow to its full strength of 5,800 civilian and military contracting personnel is ensuring 
the training and development of its civilians.  This ACC growth in personnel is in line 
with the Army’s commitment to develop its acquisition workforce.  To this end, the 
current ACC Executive Director, Jeff Parsons, sees his most important role as taking care 
of the people who make up this new command.63   Mandatory, standardized contracting 
training will be required early within a military or civilian career path.  
2. Unnecessary Management Levels 
Another example of the flattening of hierarchies within the Army acquisition 
workforce was the implementation of the Life Cycle Management (LCM) Initiative 
which was formally approved in 2004.  The LCM Initiative is the Army’s implementation 
of Directive 5000.1 from the DoD, Total Life Cycle System Management.  This 
flattening of hierarchies by removing a management level was a multi-step realignment 
process.  Prior to 2001, Program and Project Managers (PMs) and their requisite 
acquisition programs fell under one of three major Army Material Command (AMC) 
subordinate commands.  In October 2001, the Army abolished a level of AMC hierarchy 
by realigning all PMs into existing, restructured or newly created Program Executive 
Office (PEO) organizations.  According to an article on life cycle management, “This 
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action abolished the Deputies for System Acquisition in three AMC major subordinate 
commands (the Army Aviation and Missile Command, Army Tank-automotive and 
Armaments Command, and Army Communications-Electronics Command) and realigned 
their functions to the PEOs.”64  This restructuring provided a single, streamlined chain of 
command for acquisition functions and made them responsible and accountable for all 
life cycle phases of their assigned programs.  However, this realignment did not include 
the funding, personnel, or other necessary resources required to conduct sustainment 
functions.  Since sustainment costs are typically the largest portion of life cycle costs for 
weapon systems, it became imperative to align this support structure under those 
professionals charged with the responsibility and accountability for all life cycle phases 
of a weapon system, the PEO/PM.   
In 2002, AMC further advanced the Army LCM initiative by creating the Army 
Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), thereby consolidating 
all organizations responsible for research, development and engineering within the AMC 
major subordinate commands under one organization.  This command is responsible for 
the technology development efforts which assist the PEOs in getting the Warfighter the 
right capabilities when needed. 
While the realignment of PEO/PMs and the creation of RDECOM enabled the 
Army to establish direct command and support functions to integrate technologies into 
Army acquisition programs, the sustainment portion was still separated from the other 
acquisition functions.   It became necessary to implement additional restructuring in order 
to eliminate the three “stovepiped” communities of technology development, acquisition 
and sustainment that resulted from the changes made to AMC’s structure.  
In 2004, through a memorandum of agreement between the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, The Honorable Claude Bolton, Jr., 
and the Commanding General of AMC at the time, General Paul Kern, formally initiated 
a plan for the two organizations to work together to establish life cycle management 
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commands (LCMCs). This initiative was approved by then Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Peter Schoomaker on August 16, 2004.65 
This initiative also aligned with General Shinseki’s Transformation Plan, to 
develop a networked system that linked Warfighters at all levels with the sustaining base 
in order to create a seamless workforce wherein the front line Soldiers could receive 
technologically advanced capabilities.  Sustainment concerns would be integrated into the 
development and acquisition of weapon systems in order to ensure a high quality 
continuous support to the Warfighter.66 
According to the 2008 Army Posture Statement, there are currently four LCMCs 
aligned along the following commodity lines: 1) tank, automotive and armaments; 2) 
aviation and missile; 3) communications and electronics; and 4) Joint munitions and 
lethality.  All LCM Commands and PEOs operate under a collaborative partnership and 
align resources in order to support the Warfighter by providing him with the capabilities 
he needs.  Additionally, the DA–led Lean Six Sigma approach is being used to identify, 
measure, and implement continuous process improvement.67  
3. Creating Efficiencies 
In October 2006, When LTG Ross Thompson assumed his duties as the Military 
Deputy (MILDEP) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (ASAALT) and as Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM), he 
discovered that only 37 percent of all Army AL&T Workforce members were certified in 
their position of record.68  This discovery was followed by his first memorandum to the 
acquisition workforce entitled “Director, Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) Guidance 
Memorandum #1” where he stated,  
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We continue to be a great force multiplier for the Army, and I want to 
make us even more valuable to the Soldiers and families that we support. 
We must continue to build upon our past efforts to improve our AAC Core 
Competencies and the development of our workforce. In concert with our 
strategic partners, we will continually improve how we develop, test, 
acquire, field and sustain products.  
We will focus on developing Military and Civilian Acquisition workforce 
personnel that are expert, relevant and ready to support the acquisition 
mission along the full spectrum of military operations from war to 
defending the Homeland. It is incumbent upon leaders to ensure that 
people performing missions have the tools and training required for 
successful execution of their duties. This will allow us to continually 
improve as a community and enable us to provide unparalleled capabilities 
to the Soldier in the field.69 
As previously noted, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) established education and training standards, requirements, and courses for the 
civilian and military workforce.  As per the DOD Desk Guide, Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (AL&T) workforce members are required to be certified in their positions 
within 24 months of assignment to the position.70  Certification is achieved by meeting 
the mandatory certification standards as set out in the DoD Directive 5000.52, “Defense 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career 
Development Program” and available on the Defense Acquisition University website.71    
On October 1, 2007, the United States Army Acquisition Service Center 
(USAASC) launched a web-based application, the Certification Management System 
(CMS), whereby acquisition workforce personnel are able to apply for certification of all 
acquisition position levels within all acquisition career fields.  This web-based 
application for all DAWIA certifications negates the prior method of a paper-intensive 
application, review, notification and documentation process.      Supervisors are now able 
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to view all employees’ position certification requirements and completion status in one 
centralized location as all the DAU requirements are built into the CMS system.  The 
normal 30-60 day approval window is typically reduced to 1-2 days through the web-
based site.72 
The CMS application can be found on the Career Acquisition Management Portal 
(CAMP), where the stated purpose is to simplify acquisition career management tools by 
implementing a single point of entry for the Army acquisition personnel.73  As CMS will 
rely heavily on the information that is contained within each individual applicant’s 
Acquisition Career Record Brief (ACRB), Officer Record Brief (ORB) or Enlisted 
Record Brief (ERB), both military and civilian acquisition workforce members must 
ensure their relevant information is accurate and up-to-date.  Also located within the 
CAMP portal are links to other important acquisition workforce documents such as the 
Individual Development Plan (IDP), Senior Rater Potential Evaluation (SERP), and the 
Army Acquisition Professional Development System.  LTG Thompson has stated that 
acquisition workforce members need to take individual responsibility for their own career 
management.74  Within the CAMP portal, many of the applications needed to track and 
manage one’s own career are located in one place.   
Additionally, USAASC used IT solutions to increase efficiency and reduce travel 
costs through the use of virtual award boards for those board members selected to serve 
on the Army Acquisition Excellence, Project/Product Manager and Acquisition Director 
of the Year and David Packard Awards boards.75   
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D. INCORPORATION OF FLEXIBLE PRACTICES 
As early as 2002, the GAO reported that it was imperative that government 
agencies utilize human capital flexibilities in order to acquire, develop and retain high-
quality federal employees.76  GAO determined that human capital flexibilities represent 
the policies and practices that an agency has the authority to implement in managing its 
workforce to accomplish its mission and achieve its goals.77   To deal with acquisition 
workforce challenges, leadership must assess those flexible practices already in use 
within the federal government today and determine which ones afford the greatest 
benefits to their workforce.  The GAO has determined those work-life programs, or those 
programs which allow employees to balance their work and family life in a manner that is 
mutually beneficial to themselves and their organization, were cited highly effective for 
recruiting, motivating and retaining their staff.78  Adapting one or a variety of flexible 
practices within an organization will be discussed. 
1. Pay Incentives 
 Probably the greatest incentive across the workforce is the money employees can 
and potentially will earn.  The National Security Personnel System (NSPS), a pay for 
performance method of determining salaries, makes recognition of this sentiment.  NSPS 
was intended to replace the established General Schedule (GS) pay grade system to allow 
DoD to better attract, recruit, retain, compensate, reward, and manage its personnel.  This 
pay system was intended to create a civilian workforce that is competency-focused and 
performance-based.  It is designed to be DoD’s flexible and responsive civilian 
management system that will value employees’ performance and contributions, 
encourage communication, support broader skill development, promote excellence in the 
workplace and to put the right people in the right jobs at the right time.  The system was 
designed to incorporate many best business practices such as focusing on people, 
performance, and employment decisions that are cost-effective.  As stated on the NSPS 
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Web site, the system is structured to provide “an accountable, more flexible, results-
oriented civilian workforce which can more efficiently respond to difficult situations, 
proactively seek solutions, expand workforce capabilities, improve the capacities of our 
allies abroad, and strengthen the country’s global posture.”79      
However, numerous inequities and inconsistencies were noted in how 
performance ratings, raises, and bonuses were meted out to more than 102,000 employees 
in January 2009.  A Federal Times analysis of the data80 showed that minorities received 
lower ratings, raises, and bonuses than white employees.  For some groups, the shortfall 
was significant.  Moreover, both raise and bonus payouts did not match with performance 
ratings for some categories of employees.  For instance, black employees had lower 
performance ratings overall than their Asian-American counterparts, yet blacks received 
higher raises and bonuses overall.  Men and women had identical ratings overall, yet 
women took home larger payouts on average.  
These findings have fueled the debate over whether to continue, overhaul or 
terminate NSPS.  Many opponents cite these inequities as cause for terminating NSPS.  
They argue that such results should be expected when moving from the General Schedule 
system, in which everyone gets top performance ratings and equal raises, to one where 
performance is measured more subjectively, individual by individual. To this end, the 
DoD and the OPM announced on March 16, 2009, that a comprehensive review would 
immediately commence. The review will include a thorough examination of all NSPS 
policies, regulations, and practices.81  DoD will cease any further conversions to the 
NSPS system pending the results of the review. 
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The Federal Times polls below show that the present pay for performance 
programs lack buy-in from a majority of the respondents (62 percent want to keep the GS 
system), and that many (50 percent) feel their annual ratings do not accurately reflect 
their performance. 
Table 2.   GS or Performance Pay.  (From:  Federal Times, 2008) 
Would you rather be paid under the General Schedule or a 
performance pay system? Percent 
 
Votes 
I get GS pay, but I would rather get Performance Pay. 14 %  213 
I get GS pay, and I would like to keep it that way. 62 %  923 
I get Performance Pay, and I would like to keep it that way. 8 %  120 
I get Performance Pay, but I would rather get GS pay. 16 %  244 
Total votes 100% 1500 
Table 3.   Performance Rating.  (From: Federal Times, 2008) 
Do you think your last annual performance rating fairly and 
accurately reflected your performance?  Percent 
 
Votes 
Yes 38 %  339 
No, it should have been higher 50 %  454 
No, it should have been lower 4 %  33 
I've not had a performance review in the last 12 months 9 %  78 
Total votes  904 
A GAO report, released April 1, 2009, states that DoD has taken some steps to 
employ safeguards in order to ensure that NSPS is fair, credible and effective.82  
However, GAO further finds that the implementation of three safeguards in particular 
could be improved.  By not utilizing a third party to analyze rating results for anomalies, 
DoD has no process in place to determine if these ratings are nondiscriminatory before 
being finalized.  Additionally, by not instructing their commands to publish their final 
rating distributions, DoD lacks the transparency needed to allay employee’s beliefs about 
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the fairness of their own ratings in comparison to others within their own command.  
Finally, NSPS guidance indicates that the majority of employees should be rated at the 
“3” level, on a scale of 1-5.   By not encouraging pay pools and supervisors to use all 
categories (1-5), NSPS guidance appears to indicate an unspoken forced distribution of 
ratings, further compounding a lack of confidence in the system.  
Research has shown that many federal workers continue to object to the NSPS 
pay-for-performance model.  This concern is summarized below, 
Many federal workers strongly object to the NSPS pay-for-performance 
model. They don’t trust the employee rating system that affects pay raises. 
Union leaders have targeted it because they feel it would hold down the 
wages of workers.   “NSPS is the biggest affront to the federal workforce 
in modern history, and it is killing morale within the department,” said 
Richard N. Brown, president of the National Federation of Federal 
Employees. “The overwhelming majority of Defense workers despise 
NSPS. Repealing NSPS is our top legislative priority. We want it gone this 
year.83  
Pentagon officials have indicated that halting the conversions now really wouldn't 
mean much since almost all of the workers who would be placed under the NSPS are 
already there.  With the ongoing review of the NSPS pay for performance system, further 
analysis is being done. 
2. Work-Life Programs  
Alternative Work Schedules (AWS) are another type of incentive within the 
federal government.   According to OPM, an AWS allows some flexibility from a 
traditional fixed work schedule of the typical eight hours per day, forty hours per week 
schedule.   AWS has two categories, flexible work schedules (FWS) and compressed 
work schedules (CWS).  For those employees utilizing a FWS, management may agree to 
allow employees to vary their start and ending hours, as long as they work the required 
number of hours per day in order to achieve the 80 hour/biweekly total.  Those 
employees who work a CWS will work fewer but longer days, while still maintaining the 
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80 hour/biweekly total.  Employees may utilize an AWS for various reasons, such as 
avoiding traffic congestion, fitting into their child care plans or completing personal 
errands.   
 Managers who allow their employees to utilize AWS must be willing to accept 
the challenge of keeping track of a variety of different schedules.  The GAO reports 
numerous instances where this flexibility has increased employee morale and allowed 
their employees to be more flexible in accomplishing their job responsibilities.   
Tables 4 and 5 below list the results of The Federal Times government wide 
readership surveys regarding AWS.  Table 4 surveyed for opinions on FWS and Table 5 
surveyed for CWS. 
Table 4.   Flexible Work Schedule (FWS).  (From: Federal Times, 2009) 
Do you have a flexible schedule at work? Percent Votes 
Yes, a half day off a week 1 %  9
Yes, one day off a week 6 %  68
Yes, one day off every two weeks 23 %  259
Yes, with some teleworking 7 %  83
No 63% 706
Total votes  1125
 
Table 5.   Compressed Work Schedule.  (From: Federal Times, 2009) 
If given the opportunity, would you prefer to work four 
days (10 hours each) instead of five days a week? Percent 
 
Votes 
Yes 75 %  1437
No, the nature of my work won't allow a four-day week 7 %  141
No, my family responsibilities wouldn't allow it 8 %  149
I already work an alternative schedule 10 %  184
Total votes  1911
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The survey results indicate that roughly 37 percent of the respondents participate 
in some form of AWS, and that 75 percent would favor a four day, ten hour per day work 
week. 
An example of where AWS is being used as an incentive is at Fort Belvoir, VA.  
The Fort Belvoir installation commander has established a goal of reducing the amount of 
single-occupancy vehicles by 10 percent over the next two years.  In order to achieve that 
goal, AWS has been put forward as one of five measures to be considered and is being 
promoted through local organizations in order to reduce traffic.  The remaining four 
measures are teleworking, which will be discussed later in this chapter, RideShare Web 
sites, and internal and external shuttles.   With the initial interest shown in AWS and 
teleworking, the Fort Belvoir installation is now developing policies for those two 
measures for tenant units and agencies.  The next steps in promoting the goal of reducing 
single-occupancy vehicles reportedly will be policy education and the encouragement of 
post leadership to gain participation.84   
3. Quality of Life 
 In October 2001, DoD established a Telework Policy and Guide pursuant to 
Public Law 106-346, Section 359, whereby the intent was to advocate telework as a 
flexible practice for both managers and eligible employees throughout DoD.  The DoD 
Telework Policy further mandated that 25 percent of the eligible Federal workforce must 
be offered the opportunity to telework, while an additional 25 percent of the eligible 
Federal workforce must be offered the opportunity to telework each successive year, thus 
permitting every eligible employee the opportunity to telework by the end of Fiscal Year 
2004.85  The policy was designed to actively promote telework as a legitimate DoD 
flexible practice for managers and their employees, thereby enabling the recruitment and 
retention of high-quality employees through quality of life enhancements. The policy 
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would also afford the accommodation of people with disabilities, or those with 
continuing or temporary health problems, such as the flu.  Further cost savings would be 
realized through the reduction of traffic congestion and decreased energy consumption 
and pollution emissions, the reduction in office space, parking facilities, and 
transportation costs, including costs associated with payment of a transit subsidy, and to 
complement Continuity of Operations Program (COOP) plans.    
The House and the Senate each continue to pass separate bills, the latest in 2008, 
in an attempt to strengthen the original law and make it possible for more federal 
employees to telework.  The latest bill would utilize a formula whereby eligible 
employees would be permitted to telework at least 20 percent of the hours they worked in 
every two workweeks.  This formula change would also allow eligible AWS employees 
to telework.86  Eligibility for teleworking would be determined by individual agencies 
and those employees who handle classified information, have daily face-to-face contact 
with the public, or must utilize certain equipment to perform their jobs could be denied 
this benefit.  To date, neither of these bills has been passed into law. 
While some federal agencies are seen as encouraging to teleworkers and have 
seen no decline in productivity, teleworking may still be resisted by many other federal 
managers.  Managers are concerned with communication and equipment issues and 
contend that their offices may not be able to respond effectively to immediate work 
requests.  
In a December 17, 2007 Commentary in Federal Times, Deborah S. Cohn, then 
acting chief administrative officer of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) stated 
that as a decades old business strategy, teleworking has been very successful for the 
agency, the employees and the American economy, citing many of the benefits already 
discussed.  In Oct 2007, 40.7 percent of the total PTO work force and 45.7 percent of the 
total eligible employees were participating in some form of telework, making this 
telework program among the largest and most progressive within the federal government. 
According to the Telework Exchange estimates, PTO employees who telework 
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collectively save more than 613,000 gallons of gas, which translates into $1.8 million 
savings in fuel costs and reduce emissions by more than 9,600 tons. 
Several surveys addressing telework have been conducted by Federal Times.  
Table 6 illustrates that more than two-thirds of respondents to a recent survey indicated 
that no one has teleworked at their office within the last five years.  Table 7 indicates 
some teleworking obstacles, with management acceptance possibly being the key.  It is 
evident that acceptance of teleworking has a long way to go.  In the meantime, Congress 
can continue to enact the governing rules and enforce implementation goals.    
Table 6.   Teleworking—Last 5 Years.  (From: Federal Times, 2008) 
What impact, if any, has teleworking had in your office in 
the last five years? Percent 
 
Votes 
The teleworking we've had works well 19 %  138
The teleworking we've had has not worked well 5 %  37
It's too early to tell the impact of teleworking 7 %  52
No one teleworks at my office 68 %  487
Total votes  714
 
Table 7.   Teleworking Obstacles.  (From: Federal Times, 2008) 
What is the biggest obstacle to your teleworking? Percent Votes 
Job requirements 28 %  177
Lack of permission from manager 59 %  372
Lack of equipment at home 7 %  46
No convenient telework center 5 %  34
Total votes  629
4. Educational Opportunities 
Advancement opportunities for members of the acquisition workforce are being 
fostered broadly, in one respect, by increases in educational opportunities.  Continuing 
education is one area emphasized in the 1990 DAWIA, which was enacted in part to 
improve the effectiveness of the civilian and military acquisition workforce through 
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enhanced education, training, and career development.   Certification in an acquisition 
position is a workforce quality indicator.   Fifty-six percent of the DoD acquisition 
workforce has met their position certification requirements (Appendix).  As baby 
boomers depart, managers may be challenged to ensure remaining workforce members 
are afforded the opportunity to reach their specific certification levels.   
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s Administrator, Paul Denett, told a 
Senate subcommittee in February 2008 that the administration has made strides in this 
area to strengthen the acquisition workforce.  New certification programs for contracting 
officers, program managers and contracting officer technical representatives have been 
put in place which will help to standardize training and experience levels.  Karen Pica, 
director of the Federal Acquisition Institute, and Frank Anderson Jr., president of the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), testified that the three-year-old partnership 
between the two institutions has significantly benefited the training, recruitment and 
retention of the acquisition workforce, citing a 529 percent increase in the number of 
people graduating from DAU's certification training programs since 2005.  According to 
the DAU Human Capital Fact Sheet, Appendix, as of September 30, 2007, 56 percent of 
the entire Defense acquisition workforce had reached their position level certification 
requirement.    
Another development has been the Army acquisition workforces’ affiliation with 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  The Army took over as the sponsor for the 
resident acquisition program in the early 1990’s and initiated the Master of Science in 
Program Management (MSPM) in 1999 via video teleconference (VTC).87  Beginning in 
2007, this course of study was further expanded to include delivery over the Internet, 
using a web-conferencing tool called Elluminate.  As explained on the NPS website, 
these classes afford the students the opportunity to participate from their home command 
location, providing the student the ability to maintain their current position while 
attaining this career-enhancing degree. This distance learning program has provided 
opportunities not previously available to DA personnel, and may serve as a model for 
other non-resident education curricula. 
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E. FOSTERING OF DIVERSITY 
Diversity includes creating a workforce which is reflective of society and 
provides opportunities for all.  It also allows bringing people into the workforce with 
diverse backgrounds who are then educated and trained to work within the acquisition 
system.  Furthermore, a system may gain strength by having a people with a diversity of 
experiences.  Older, more experienced people can provide mentorship and leadership for 
the newer members of the acquisition workforce.  An obvious premise is that younger, 
entry level people must be recruited in order to breathe vitality into a complex system, 
including bringing new ideas, methods and technology savvy. 
The Army’s acquisition workforce leadership has aligned itself with the Office of 
Personnel Management’s 2006-2010 Strategic and Operational Plan, which includes a 
demographic outlook/assessment as one of its operational goals.  It states, “Demographic 
factors external to the agency impact the achievement of our goals … we anticipate an 
increase in the number of veterans and diversity in the workforce.”88   
DA, in conjunction with DoD, continually assesses the state of the acquisition 
workforce.  One aspect of this has been an analysis of the generational composition of the 
workforce.  Today’s DoD AT&L workforce consists of at least four distinct generations: 
the silent generation, the baby boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y.89   
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Table 8.   AT&L Workforce by Generation.  (From DoD, 2007) 
Workforce  





11.5 7.5% 45,625 6.7% 8,322 7.4%
Baby Boomers       
(1946‐1964)
61.5 42.0% 438,971 64.5% 77,729 68.7%
Generation X        
(1965‐1976)
43.5 29.5% 132,948 19.5% 17,581 15.5%
Generation Y        
(1977‐1989)
31.5 21.0% 62,676 9.2% 9,394 8.3%
Millennium           
(1990‐present)
51 0% 153 0% 0 0%













Each generation has distinct characteristics (table 6) that identify them within the 
workforce, with the most differences being found between the baby boomers and the Gen 
X and Gen Y workers.  Baby boomers tend to be defined by their work and generally 
have a “do what it takes” outlook about their work.  The Gen X and Gen Y workers tend 
to desire their lifestyle be balanced between their work and their personal life, i.e., 
defined by a “work to live” attitude.  Baby boomers tend to feel more loyalty towards 
their employers, while until the global economic crisis, Gen X and Gen Y workers rarely 
experienced unemployment and constantly sought advancement even if it meant job 
hopping.  As younger workers grew up with instant access to information through the 
Internet and cable TV, they may expect their employers to offer the same type of 
environment.   
Some of these differences can be attributed to each groups’ career stage.  The 
silent generation and the baby boomers are looking forward to retirement, and are more 
concerned with their financial independence, health care and pension plans.  The Gen X 
and Y workforce are focusing on increasing their marketable skills in order to prepare 
themselves for future opportunities.  While the current global economic crisis has had all 
workforce members readjust their priorities concerning their employment, leadership can 
 
 56
struggle to understand the differences in attitudes and work ethics each generation brings 
to their job.  Doing so may further enhance workforce recruitment, development and 
retention strategies.   
Table 9.   Generational Differences in the U.S. Workforce. (From: DoD, 2007) 
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• Younger workers 
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The retention focus is on the impending baby boomer gap,90 pursuant to the 
Office of Federal Procurement’s Policy recommendation that agencies need to create and 
use incentives for qualified senior, experienced acquisition workforce personnel to 
remain in the acquisition workforce.  "With every new retiree, the government is losing 
important institutional knowledge," said Sen. Daniel Akaka, D-Hawaii. "The government 
must act aggressively now in analyzing acquisition workforce trends so that a brain drain 
does not develop. . ."91    
As seen in figure 4 below, as the entire U.S. labor force ages, the expected growth 
rate for those individuals aged 45 years and older is anticipated to be over 13 million 
compared to the growth rate of 1.7 million for those aged 44 and below.   This is due 
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primarily to the aging of the baby boomer population, who now make up almost 70 
percent of our current DoD acquisition workforce.  As the older workforce moves 
through their organizations, they increasingly approach eligible retirement.  This may 
produce gaps in leadership positions which must be filled by those from the younger age 
groups.  Leaders must come up with innovative recruitment, development and retention 
strategies to hire and keep this smaller replacement population of Gen X, Y and 

















Figure 5.   Change in Labor Force by Age, Projected 2004-2014. (From: DoD AT&L 
Human Capital Strategic Plan, 2007) 
1. Targeting Older Workers 
DoD also uses retired military officers as an alternative source to fill the more 
senior civilian ranks.  As the military tends to provide more education, training and 
leadership opportunities, retired service members are often viewed as highly qualified.  
There was an increase in the number of retired service members pursuing civilian jobs in 
Defense after 2003, when former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld waived a rule that 
forced retirees to wait six months before they could take a civilian DoD job.  Retirees 
were also more amenable to working for DoD after a 1999 law ended the so-called dual-
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compensation penalty at Defense.  Retirees who work within DoD are now able to draw 
both their full annuities and salaries; previously their salaries were docked.  Retired 
military at Defense’s GS-14, GS-15 and senior executive levels ranged from 12 percent 
to 16 percent in 2003.  The range has now increased from 20 percent to 26 percent.  
There has also been an increase in the rate of retired military who are promoted to SES.  
In 2003, 16 percent of SES promotions went to retired military; by 2007, retired military 
promotions reached 19 percent.92 
As baby boomers may be more concerned with their financial independence, 
health care and pension plans, the current global economic crisis may encourage some 
retired federal workers to return to federal employment.  There are several issues 
concerning retired federal workers which may need to be sorted out before the retired 
talent would come back.  Current federal law requires rehired employees’ pay to be cut 
by the amount of their pension.  Legislation allowing rehired federal workers to work 
part-time without losing that pension is being put forward by Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) and 
Susan Collins (R-Maine).  However, worker’s retirement benefits would not grow based 
on this additional part-time employment.  “Giving the government the flexibility to call 
on retired federal workers will help slow the government's impending brain drain,” Kohl 
said. "This bill will ensure that our most experienced federal employees will be paid 
fairly for their continued contributions."93  As of this writing, this Senate bill is still being 
considered at the committee level. 
Several other initiatives could also benefit both the government and those federal 
workers approaching retirement.   In a bill sponsored by Kohl and Sen. George V. 
Voinovich (R-Ohio), those federal employees who fall under the Civil Service 
Retirement System (CSRS) could chose to work part-time as they near the end of their 
federal service without losing their total CSRS annuities. The annuities would be prorated 
for that term of part-time employment.  This would enable the government some stability 
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in their succession planning by retaining retiring workers who find a full time schedule 
too demanding.  Their expertise would still be available as they mentored the incoming 
federal workers.  At this writing, this issue is also being considered at the Senate 
committee level.  
As baby boomers are concerned with their financial independence and their 
pension plans, another flexible practice which the federal government affords its 
employees is The Thrift Savings Plan (TSP).  TSP is the retirement savings and 
investment plan established by Congress in the Federal Employees' Retirement System 
(FERS Act of 1986).   TSP was designed to offer Federal employees the same type of 
retirement income as private companies offer to their employees within their traditional 
individual retirement accounts—401(k) plans.   Federal employees are afforded the 
opportunity to invest an amount determined annually by the Internal Revenue Code into 
six major investment funds. Recent changes now include “catch up” contributions for 
employees over 50.  All contributions are tax deferred, just like the 401(k) plans.  There 
has been some interest in allowing a TSP option for a “Roth” type investment, which 
pays the tax up front, but does not tax withdrawals.  
Some of the more financially savvy investors had previously been making 
numerous transactions, known as interfund transfers (IFTs) in an effort to time the stock 
market.94  These actions caused additional administrative financial charges to the TSP 
managers, so measures were taken to limit the number of transfers per month.  The 
current regulations allow the first two IFTs to be redistributed among any or all of the 
TSP funds.  After that, for the remainder of the month, IFTs can only move money into 
the Government Securities Investment (G) Fund.   
The below surveys by Federal Times reflect the employees preferences regarding 
these TSP rules.   From the number of respondents in each of the surveys, one can 
conclude that long term financial independence is very important.  The overwhelming 
majority of those respondents to the TSP survey are in favor of adding the Roth 401(k) 
option to the TSP.  Additionally, 63 percent of those who responded to a survey on fund 
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transfers feel that the government should not restrict the number of fund transfers a 
worker makes.  However, this is also a cautious group, with 63 percent of those surveyed 
claiming they had not and do not plan to trade funds in their TSP accounts in light of the 
recent downturn in the market. 
Table 10.   Roth 401(k).  (From: Federal Times, 2009) 
Do you think a Roth 401(k) option should be added to the 
Thrift Savings Plan? Percent Votes 
Yes 84 %  2069
No 16 %  401
Total votes  2470
 
Table 11.   TSP Fund Transfers.  (From: Federal Times, 2009) 
Should the Thrift Savings Plan limit the number of fund 
transfers investors can make? Percent Votes 
Yes, to 2 per month as planned. 10 %  399
Yes, but more than 2 per month should be allowed. 7 %  305
No, but those transferring money should pay fees to cover 
transfer costs. 
20 %  798
No, unlimited free transfers should continue. 63 %  2570
Total votes  4072
 
Table 12.   TSP Fund Trades.  (From: Federal Times, 2009) 
Did you or will you trade funds in your TSP account in 
response to the recent stock market downturn? Percent Votes 
Yes, toward more aggressive funds 9 %  97
Yes, toward more conservative funds 24 %  269
No 67 %  746
Total votes  1112
2. Targeting Entry Level Workers 
In order to refill the ranks of the workforce as the expected attrition rates of the 
older generation rise, the federal government has utilized several hiring practices to 
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attract younger workforce members.  Three practices authorized by 5 United States Code 
5753 and 5754, Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives, will be examined in 
this report.  These three incentives, known as the three R’s, are designed to provide a 
monetary incentive for an individual or group to accept employment have been used to 
attract younger workers and to bridge the pay gap between Federal and private-sector 
salaries.  These practices can also be used to provide incentives for current workforce 
members to remain employed in the Federal service in a current position(s). 
According to an Office of Personnel Management report to Congress,95 DoD saw 
a 34 percent increase in the number of employees receiving student loan repayment benefits 
in FY07 over the previous year.  During that time period, DoD paid out nearly $6.3 million in 
these benefits to 1,860 employees.  Of that number, 871 employees were in engineering 
positions, with 262 mechanical engineers, 166 nuclear engineers, 100 electronics engineers, 
and 72 electrical engineers receiving this incentive.  This also accounted for a 37 percent 
increase in the total amount of student loan repayment benefits provided.  Engineers who 
received student loan repayment benefits include.  DoD also provided student loan repayment 
benefits to 109 contract specialists and 75 information technology specialists.  In light of 
some of the issues which have manifested themselves during our current contingency 
operations, attracting a workforce in these last two specialties may provide some much 
needed help.  At DoD, the student loan repayment program is considered to be a useful and 
effective human capital management tool as it enables recruitment and retention of the 
workforce.  
DoD has also found success in attracting entry level members through the use of 
their intern program.  DoD’s intern programs are slightly different than those offered 
through the private industry, which tend to be of a temporary nature.  DoD offers two 
variations of intern programs.  Their summer-hire program offers full-time jobs for 
students from the end of May to typically the middle of August.  This time frame allows 
 
                                                 
95 United States Office of Personnel Management Report to Congress, “Federal Student Loan 
Repayment Program Fiscal Year 2007.” (May 2008). 
http://www.opm.gov/oca/pay/studentloan/html/FY2007StudentLoanRepaymentReport.pdf  (accessed April 
18, 2009). 
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students to complete their current year of college and work the majority of the summer 
until the beginning of their next school year.  They may be converted to a permanent 
intern program after graduation. 
 In July 2000, President Clinton authorized the Defense Career Intern Program 
(DCIP) as a tool to attract exceptional men and women to the Federal workforce who 
have diverse professional experiences, academic training, and competencies.  DCIP is 
designed to be a noncompetitive recruitment program, where hiring managers directly 
recruit individuals without publicly advertised the positions. DCIP interns typically 
undergo a two-year internship beginning at grade levels GS-5, 7, or 9 and may be 
promoted up to target grades of GS-11, 12 and 13. Each intern completes a formal 
training and development program, consisting of on-the-job and classroom training for 
their position.  Upon successful completion of their internship, the intern is 
noncompetitively converted to permanent appointments. Additionally, those interns who 
are US citizens may see their position converted to a career or a career-conditional 
appointment within the DoD at the completion of the program.  
Some of the intern positions require mobility statements, whereby an intern could 
be trained in one location, but once training is complete, may be moved to where there is 
a need for their position.  Depending on the position, some interns may be deployed 
oversees if there is a need. 
As indicated, recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives can be and are 
utilized to keep members of the current workforce employed in their current positions.96  
On December 3, 2007, OPM issued a memorandum for Chief Human Capital 
Officers requesting agencies to submit a report on their use of recruitment, relocation, 
and retention incentives in calendar year 2007.  The memorandum requested agencies to 
report information as a single entity; therefore, data in the report was not broken out by 
sub agency.  OPM did invite agencies to comment on any barriers they faced in using 
these incentives as human capital flexibilities.  
                                                 
96
Information for this area was obtained from The Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) 
Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives Calendar Year 2007 Report to the Congress Presented in 
September 2008. 
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Overall, 41 Federal agencies paid 32,484 recruitment, relocation, and retention 
incentives worth more than $207 million, with an average incentive payment of $6,394 
during calendar year 2007.  This was comprised of 7,716 recruitment incentives totaling 
over $57.5 million (average payment of $7,454); 1,974 relocation incentives totaling 
more than $23.1 million (average payment of $11,735); and 22,794 retention incentives 
totaling over $127 million (average payment of $5,573).  Agencies consistently reported 
using the incentives to accomplish strategic human capital goals. 
Defense and Veterans Affairs were by far the largest users—Defense paid 16,184 
incentives totaling $100,280,802.  Retention incentives enabled Defense to retain already 
trained, valued employees and negate the need to go through the lengthy recruitment 
process.  Retention incentives were paid to employees in fifty-three pay plans besides the 
GS pay plan.  Also, more than 12 percent of retention incentives were paid to Defense 
employees in NSPS pay plans.  Individual bonuses in engineering ranged from $5,000 to 
$11,000, and contracting was $5,000 to $8,500, with the average incentive reported as 
$5,172. 
DoD AT&L is working in partnership with the NSPS PEO to develop an 
Accelerated Compensation Development Program to encompass pay bands 2 and 3.  This 
will allow more flexibility in performance awards, as it will increase the upper bound 
limit.97 
The recruitment incentives enhanced Defense efforts in recruiting for hard-to-fill 
occupations.  A number of examples illustrate the effectiveness of the recruitment, 
relocation, and retention authorities.   Recruitment incentives appealed to graduating 
students from top colleges in the nation for difficult-to-fill intern positions, as well as 
attracting candidates in information technology (IT), financial management, air traffic 
control, and safety management to hard-to-fill positions, especially those overseas.  
Recruitment incentives for linguists and police officers are now addressing a Defense 
need to significantly increase those skill populations.   They have also proven effective 
for filling positions in occupations requiring position education, such as auditors and 
 
                                                 
97 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, 6. 
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accountants.  Some recruitment incentives offset the high cost of housing in metropolitan 
areas, and have proven vital to staffing efforts in the Balkans and re-basing efforts in the 
European theater.  
F. GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS 
As the world has moved towards a more global marketplace, organizations are 
challenged to develop cross-cultural communication skills to adapt to global business 
transactions.  Managers who acquire and excel at using these skills may succeed in 
advancing diversity sensitivity within their own organizations. The Army’s AT&L 
leadership recognizes the importance of this and addresses it in its Strategic Plan saying, 
“Significant technological advancements during the 20th century have driven changes in 
countries around the world. This is having a profound effect on both the U.S. economy 
and its military.”98   
1. Interdependence of Governments 
As with the rest of the Army, the acquisition workforce is striving to adapt to a 
changing world.  Personnel are learning to work and live in environments that are 
increasingly complex with a greater mix of uniformed military, civilian, foreign nationals 
from third party countries and host nation individuals and organizations.  They must be 
trained and ready to engage the world with an appreciation of diverse cultures and to 
communicate directly with local populations. 
Operations since the end of the Cold War in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and relief operations in Indonesia provide ample evidence of this new 
environment.  In each of these operations, we have seen an increase in the number of 
contractors employed to support tasks and even whole missions that were once the 
exclusive purview of the uniformed military.  The Army Contracting Corps has seen 
requirements expanded exponentially as a result and in the early stages of the large 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan been challenged to respond.  As we have previously 
discussed, this has resulted in a partial transformation of the Army Contracting Agency, 
                                                 
98 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, 6.  
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reflecting many of The “New” Organization characteristics.  Still, a requirement for 
virtually building cities in the desert to support combat operations in an austere 
environment has stressed our capabilities to the limit.  We find that a combat force of 
150,000 requires a contracted support force of almost the same number.  The burden for 
providing this support has fallen to the Army Contracting Command. 
Operations in distant locations around the world also stress the supply lines that 
the acquisition workforce must support.  Experts in systems and other acquisition 
functions must deploy to these combat locations providing on-site support to the 
Warfighter.  This requirement may be beyond the capabilities of the workforce to 
support.   
2. Cross-Cultural Communication Skills 
In light of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the House Armed 
Services Subcommittee (HASC) on Oversight and Investigations released a study in 
November 2008 looking at how well the DoD has brought the language and cultural 
competency of our Warfighters to the forefront.  Their results indicate that some action 
has been taken.   DoD issued DoD Directive 5160.41E, Defense Language Program, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 3126.01, Language and 
Regional Expertise Planning. The directive establishes as DoD policy that “[f]oreign 
language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD 
mission.”99 The Army’s goal is to achieve a “balanced” set of cultural and foreign 
language competencies for its Soldiers and its leaders, and an Army with all units having 
the “right blend” of cultural and foreign language capabilities.100  To that end, the Army 
is still drafting their strategy, Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, but with the ever 
changing global conflicts, projecting what culture and languages may be needed in the 
future is difficult.   
                                                 
99 Department of Defense Directive 5160.41E, “Defense Language Program,” 21 October 2005, 5. 
100 Testimony of Brigadier General Richard C. Longo, Senior Language Authority, United States Army 
Before the United States House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Committee, 110th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 5. http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091008/Longo_Testimony091008.pdf 
(accessed April 18, 2009). 
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3. Shift of Highly Skilled Workers 
With globalization, those nations that can best create, develop and enhance their 
human resource talents may experience a competitive advantage, especially in technology 
areas. The United States has seen a decline in the number of science and engineering 
doctoral degrees in the last 10 years, due to foreign students who have chosen to continue 
their schooling in their native countries.  The U.S. produced 15 percent of the world’s 
engineering doctorates in 2002, with the foreign students on temporary visas, earning 
more than half of these degrees.101 With an increased emphasis in Asian countries on 
science and engineering training and degrees, the number of foreign students who remain 
and work in the United States after completing advanced schooling has decreased.  
Retaining personnel in the science and engineering fields of the acquisition 
workforce is more challenging, as the entire defense industry is competing for talent in 
order to maintain their current and projected workforce requirements.  As the highly 
skilled and educated Baby Boomer generation retires, that skill level leaves the defense 
industry, both Government and private.  Additionally, global competition for technical 
talent continues to increase.  Japan requires a significant number of technically proficient 
experts to enhance and maintain their industrial base and actively import large numbers 
of Asian scientists and engineers, many trained in the United States.  In addition, other 
industrial nations are now instituting immigrant-friendly policies for those with advanced 
science and engineering degrees.   
One bright spot in light of the current economic crisis has been that many 
economists believe that a strong federal work force may enable economic recovery.  
Additionally, a recent Gallup poll102 indicated DoD enjoys high name recognition, due in 
part to focusing on the unique advantages AT&L provides to the nation and our standing 
within the global environment. These advantages include delivering capabilities that 
directly equip a Warfighting military around the world.  Efforts include developing 
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 DoD AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan, 6. 
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world-class, advanced technologies, providing high levels of program management 
responsibilities not typically seen in industry, and offering other intangible satisfactions 
that stem from being a part of the best military community in the world.   
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Developing a clear idea of the relationship between characteristics of The “New” 
Organization and the design, functioning and performance of selected acquisition areas 
and programs described in the prior chapter is challenging and exploratory due to the 
number and complexity of interacting variables, e.g., political, socio-economic, 
technological.  To that end, this chapter analyzes the extent to which selected Army 
acquisition areas and programs are reflective of the characteristics of The “New” 
Organization including: 1) reliance on networks, 2) application of flatter (leaner) 
structures, 3) incorporation of more flexible practices, 4) fostering of diversity, and 5) 
global and international trends. 
B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT  
For each of The “New” Organization characteristics, we have developed an 
overall assessment of the degree to which the current acquisition workforce areas and 
programs are perceived to have transitioned to new configurations.  Assessments are 
based on the researched areas, and the extent to which the acquisition workforce overall 
reflects a shift towards the new characteristics (or not).  We are not automatically 
equating transition into new areas as necessarily good or bad, because degree of fit is 
often situationally contingent.  However, on net, organizations reflecting the five 
characteristics may be more efficient and effective.  Second, we have developed an 
assessment system which is subjective, yet informed, using a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative factors.   
For the assessments, we selected a scale from A to F based on a set of criteria 
presented in Table 13.  It is important to reinforce that these ratings are analyzing the 
degree to which the Army acquisition workforce is perceived to have shifted towards 
“New” Organization features.  An inherent assumption is that this comparative 
framework can provide a vehicle for understanding Acquisition changes in light of how 
other organizations are adapting their structures to fit 21st century environmental factors 
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and forces.  Therefore, we are not attempting to provide a grade for the acquisition 
workforce’s overall performance, but rather a grade on extent of transition to an 
alternative framework. 
Table 13.    Assessment Ratings (From: Hill and Gerstein, Authors, 2009) 
Rating Assessment 
A The tenets of The “New” Organization are being fully implemented  
B The tenets of The “New” Organization are mostly being implemented  
C The tenets of The “New” Organization are being partially implemented 
D The tenets of The “New” Organization are not being effectively implemented 
F The tenets of The “New” Organization are not being implemented at all 
 
As we develop these assessments, it is useful to note that our methodology began 
with describing characteristics of The “New” Organization in Chapter 2, followed by 
description of selected Army acquisition areas and/or projects related to these new 
features.  This chapter analyzes perceived extent of implementation that may be 
associated with the new organizational features.  Ultimately, we draw conclusions on 
extent of transition, and make recommendations for improving Army acquisition 
workforce performance relative to the new features.    Overall assessments within each of 


















• Many Army acquisition workforce areas and projects 
definitely reflect the use of networks, i.e., improving 
effectiveness and efficiency.   
• Some virtual collaboration is observable, e.g., PBUSE 
depicts a positive example.  More could be done 
considering non-DoD examples of Twitter and Facebook 
that are transforming how the world communicates and 
integrates through networking.  
• This reliance on networks and the efficiencies to be 
gleaned from this technology has been extended directly 
to the workforce through the automated CMS tracking 






• Near Army-wide recognition of the need to rely on 
flatter, leaner structures, including the acquisition 
workforce.  
•  Gansler report makes these recommendations within the 
contracting specialty and these provisions are being 
incorporated, e.g., establishment of RDECOM 
exemplifies progress in this area.   
• The move to flatter organizations and cross-functional 
teams does not appear to be consistent throughout the 
acquisition workforce.   
Incorporation 




•  NSPS can assist in providing opportunities by way of 
“pay for performance” which should  be attractive for  
Generation X and Y personnel, however, there is 
generally acknowledged  “doubt”  that NSPS  ratings 
accurately reflect  performance,  A gap between ratings 
and perceived performance could be crucial  for 
developing and retaining cohort members.   
• Work-life programs such as alternative work schedules 
have been recognized as potential solutions; however 
these programs are not widely accepted within the 
acquisition workforce.  Generally, workers like these 
new practices, but managers remain skeptical.  
• Quality of life enhancements are not widely accepted in 
the acquisition workforce.  General programs to improve 
the working environment have been incorporated, 
however in telecommuting, little has been done.   
•  Telecommuting is available to some.  Most do not have 
this flexibility and managers are skeptical about being 
able to get productive work out of a more distributed 
workforce.   
• There has been a major push to improve the education of 






This emphasis has been largely successful for education 
and training from professional development courses to 





• This focus on diversity pertains deliberately to the 
growing age-gap issue (not race or gender).   
• Little evidence observable  to account for  differences in  
generations, nor to  adjust to the characteristics  of each 
unique  population, e.g.,  baby boomers have  different 
goals and objectives than  Gen X/Y personnel.   
• While all members of the workforce will be interested in 
benefits such as TSP, fund transfers and Roth IRAs, 
these issues appear more important for older workers.   
Acquisition workforce has been given the same 
opportunities as those throughout the rest of the federal 
workforce. 
• Entry level personnel are often interested in having 
student loans paid off.  Incentives have been put into law 
which allow for these recruiting and retention programs. 
• Providing continuing education through certification 
courses and degree producing programs is a useful tool 
in recruiting and retaining quality entry level workers.  






•  An area requiring considerable attention in a 21st 
century world.   
• Operations since the end of the Cold War in places such 
as Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan have 
reinforced the need to have a global workforce. 
•  Several highly visible missteps in contracting were 
described in the Gansler report.   
• Greater cultural sensitivity and language ability can only 
make the federal workforce more adept at international 
operations, i.e., interfacing with local populations and 
businesses are the foreseeable future in supporting 
Warfighter missions ranging from humanitarian 
operations to peace and stability operations to combat. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The acquisition workforce is an essential supporting element of the overall Army 
acquisition strategy.  Much can be done to bring procurement organizations and 
personnel into a changing 21st century, including concepts associated with The “New” 
Organization features.   
This chapter is broken down into three major sections.  The first examines the 
primary and subsidiary research questions, providing a brief overview answer for each.  
The second section provides conclusions for each of The “New” Organization 
characteristics concerning the degree to which the Army acquisition workforce appears to 
have transitioned towards this new construct.  The third and final section provides 
recommendations derived from the analysis and conclusions.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the current status of U.S. Army acquisition primarily in terms of 
personnel loss and degradation of associated, required and emerging capabilities, 
i.e., what is the relationship between characteristics of The “New” Organization and 
the design, functioning and performance of Army acquisition?  
The “New” Organization construct provides a useful approach for examining the 
Army acquisition workforce which is already moving tentatively towards flatter, 
networked and more diverse organizations.  At the organizational level, we see 
substantial movement towards use of networks and towards flatter, leaner structures.  The 
same progress is not seen at many individual levels where the incorporation of flexible 
practices, managing a more diverse workforce and accounting for global and international 
trends indicate that more needs to be done.  Each of The “New” Organization 
characteristics are discussed in greater detail in Section C below.  
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2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What are the implications of change on the acquisition workforce? 
The changing acquisition workforce will necessitate more flexible 
management practices in order to account for the different levels of expertise in the 
workforce as well as the aging of the majority of the workforce.  There must be a 
continued commitment to steadily recruit qualified people until shortfalls are mitigated.  
We know from our data and analysis that different motivations drive different segments 
of the workforce.  We also know that while the older baby boomer generation served well 
and honorably, they will retire in increasing numbers.  The future of the acquisition 
workforce will be the Generation X and Y and the next generations of workers that are 
still in school who will enter the workforce over the next decade.  We will need to remain 
sensitive to the demographics of the workforce for age as well as gender and race; our 
policies and managers must adapt to demographic changes in real-time.      
• What are the emerging role and impacts of Lean processes in Army 
acquisition?   
Many applications of Lean processes have been applied within the Army. The 
acquisition workforce is no exception in this regard.  The organizational structures of the 
acquisition force in many areas such as contracting have already experienced these 
changes or are in the process of doing so.  Often, employees were asked to work within a 
new Lean organizational structure with little to no commensurate change in preparatory 
training and education.  Efforts could be made to reinforce the Lean concept where 
applicable within organizations and in individual work efforts.  Just as in Lean for 
organizations, applying the process to individuals will require those personnel to examine 
their workflow and attempt to eliminate non-core tasks; only value added work that 
directly contributes to mission accomplishment should be emphasized.  
• What are the implications of The “New” Organization on the future 
strategy for mitigating personnel losses and improving acquisition performance? 
Policies and programs must be designed to: (1) retain current quality 
personnel in the workforce, (2) recruit new members to the workforce and (3) invest in 
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new ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the current workforce.  Concepts 
such as Lean and the increasing use of networks to develop virtual collaborative 
communities and cross-functional teams appear increasingly important.  Working in a 
multi-tasked and often ambiguous environment in geographically dispersed locations 
may hinge on developing a professional and adaptive culture.  The new environment 
appears receptive to greater opportunities for using flexible practices and improving 
employee work-life balance.  For example, more personnel will likely be able to 
telecommute as the ability to be productive will be less dependent on proximity and more 
dependent of establishing the right work environment and the appropriate 
communications capabilities and processes.    
• How can components of The “New” Organization assist in retaining 
experienced acquisition workforce personnel, and attracting new, entry level 
personnel into the acquisition workforce? 
Incentives will be important for ensuring that the current cohort of acquisition 
workforce personnel is retained while the new, entry level part of the workforce 
continues to be recruited and trained.   Many of these experienced individuals are now in 
leadership positions, making it imperative to retain them in the near-term.  We know that 
the ability to attract and retain quality personnel is highly dependent on the incentives and 
opportunities perceived to be available to the workforce.  Leadership must be amenable 
to implementing flexible practices and diversity attracting programs for the emerging 21st 
century acquisition workforce.  However, this will require a different way of thinking 
about the workforce, incentives, and opportunities.  The message must be that federal 
government service, particularly in the acquisition workforce is valuable duty with 
opportunities for advancement, outstanding quality of life and meaningful work.  
Improving performance will require a major new commitment to training and education 
for both entry level and continuing professional development.   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In looking at the current Army acquisition workforce, we investigated the current 
status in terms of its projected loss of trained personnel as baby boomers continue to 
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retire.  Many in this age group were instrumental in achieving some of the illustrative 
examples of how reflective the workforce is of the characteristics of The “New” 
Organization.  This group made up the vast majority of the acquisition workforce that 
designed the Stryker from design to fielding in just six years and reorganized our 
contracting mission into the Army Contracting Corps.  With the gradual and increasing 
loss of its knowledge base, the Army faces an increasingly complex work-load 
supporting current and future contingency operations.   Strategies are needed to attract a 
workforce that can continue to improve and refine the support needed to sustain the 
Warfighter. 
The conclusions in this section are focused on The “New” Organization construct 
and the five characteristics.  For each, the overarching conclusions resulting from this 
study will be presented.   
1. Reliance on Networks 
Many organizations within the Army and the acquisition workforce have already 
moved towards the use of networks for improving their effectiveness and efficiency.  
PBUSE is one program which has demonstrated how web based applications can be 
incorporated into current operations.   Another is the use of the CMS application to track 
acquisition workforce DAWIA certification.  The acquisition workforce is continually 
assessing network type applications used by other government organizations and private 
industry for incorporation into their structures and processes. 
The growth of the Internet and expansion of information technology (IT) has been 
and will continue to be critical in expanding the use of networks. 
2. Application of Flatter (Leaner) Hierarchy 
There has been recognition throughout the Army of the need to rely on flatter, 
leaner structures where applicable.   This has been accomplished in some areas such as 
the establishment of an Army Contracting Command, and the RDECOM.   Many other 
areas need to be examined, as the move to flatter organizations and cross-functional 
teams is not uniform throughout the Army acquisition workforce.  
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3. Incorporation of Flexible Practices 
Several tools are being used in this area to attract and retain the acquisition 
workforce.  The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) has been implemented as a 
DoD-wide pay-for-performance structure which is designed to recognize outstanding 
performance.  The entire NSPS is currently under review as there are some concerns from 
both employees and managers.  Flexible Work Schedules are used by many DoD 
components, though they are not uniformly applied.  In general, members of the 
workforce like these flexible practices, but some elements of leadership remain skeptical.  
Telecommuting is becoming more widely accepted.  It is available to some employees 
now on a limited basis.  Congress is in the process of enacting a bill requiring 
government agencies to allow eligible employees to work from home or away from their 
regular office as long as telecommuting does not hamper their performance or interfere 
with agency operations. Education of the civilian workforce is receiving increased 
emphasis.  On-line courses from the Defense Acquisition University and the Masters’ 
Degree Programs from the Naval Postgraduate School are two current examples. 
4. Fostering of Diversity 
The acquisition workforce leadership recognizes the need to account for the 
differences of its baby boomer and Gen X/Y employees in skills and experiences.  Each 
also has different motivations, goals and objectives which impact on how they measure 
work-life tradeoffs.  Each is also vital to ensuring a balanced workforce that can meld 
operational experiences while planning for the future of the workforce.  This includes 
such key components as financial rewards, health care and pension plans for the older 
workers, while also providing such incentives as student loan pay-offs, promotion 
prospects and educational opportunities for younger workers.    
5. Global and International Trends 
The acquisition workforce leadership is placing more emphasis on developing 
effective cross-cultural communication skills to adapt to global business.    Acquisition 
personnel are learning to work and live in increasingly complex environments which 
have a greater mix of uniformed military, civilian, foreign nationals from third party 
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countries and host nation participants.  Efforts in the areas of recruitment and retention 
of personnel in the science and engineering fields include signing bonuses and hiring of 
retired military with acquisition and leadership experience. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
For each of the characteristics of The “New” Organization, we developed a set of 
recommendations which may enable the Army acquisition workforce to better align itself 
with this construct.  These recommendations flow directly from the Chapter III data and 
the analysis in Chapter IV.   
1. Reliance on Networks 
Army leadership should continue to emphasize the importance of and 
requirements for networking including flatter, leaner organizations.  Much has already 
been accomplished, but it is also clear that more emphasis on developing solutions that 
are fully integrated across the Joint community and within the Army is required.  More 
on this will be discussed with regard to application of flatter, leaner hierarchy. 
More networking needs to be accomplished along the lines of the PBUSE.  This 
program has already demonstrated how web based applications can be incorporated into 
current operations with great effect.  Unfortunately, this system is unique and there are 
not many others with this capacity.  The commercial world and social networking have 
provided insights into many other capabilities that are available or could become 
available for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the federal workforce and in 
particular the Army acquisition workforce.  Imagine the potential for an acquisition 
professional to be able to collaborate on a topic in real-time with experts throughout the 
Army, the Joint force and even industry concerning a question on an issue such as 
batteries or a substitute for a particular part.  These capabilities are available and in use in 
many civilian organizations such as Federal Express where they are being used to track 
packages.  We should attempt to harvest these capabilities and import them into the 
acquisition workforce wherever possible.  
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2. Application of Flatter (Leaner) Hierarchy 
The Army acquisition workforce has begun the process of transformation to 
leaner, flatter organizations.  However, as with the “reliance on network” characteristic, 
more needs to be done.   As we look throughout the Army, we find acquisition 
organizations that have not yet embarked upon or embraced Lean values which typically 
challenge traditional bureaucratic structures and processes.  The Army office under the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Business Transformation (DUSA-BT) has made great strides 
in moving the Army towards these leaner organizations.  However, we must focus our 
attention to the Acquisition Corps and workforce in particular.   
It will be important as this transformation to leaner organizations progresses that 
we do not continually improve old processes and organizational structures, but look 
instead for new ways to solve old problems.  In turn, new systems and processes require 
some cultural change reinforced by applicable rewards and incentives.  Stated more 
directly, we do not want to make old processes faster, we went to eliminate old process 
and make new, leaner efficient and effective organizations with the workforce directly 
experiencing the benefits of new, streamlined organizations.    
While the Gansler report was important for examining the contracting capabilities 
of the force and many significant changes have been and are being implemented, we must 
recognize that contracting is only one of 13 different functional areas the acquisition 
workforce is responsible for and therefore we need a similar type of evaluation across all 
the different acquisition areas. 
3. Incorporation of Flexible Practices 
To continue to incentivize civilian workforce members, leadership should 
continue to support competitive employment cost index increases across the board for 
both military and civilian acquisition employees.   
Additionally, while NSPS has met with some success within the civilian 




feel the strategies outlined by the GAO in April 2009, to include a third party analysis of 
results, publication of final rating distributions and an across the board practice of using 
all five rating levels could enhance employee acceptance of NSPS. 
The Department of Defense has set goals for moving to flexible workforce 
standards.  The surveys presented in the data clearly showed that the acquisition 
workforce is nowhere close to implementing these requirements.  More must be done to 
make the federal workforce and in particular the Army acquisition workforce more 
attractive to those already serving and for those we are trying to attract.  Programs such 
as the use of alternate work schedules, retention bonuses, credit hours, teleworking, 
flexible sick leave, enhanced thrift saving plan system, additional incentives for critical 
skills area, and other quality of life/benefit initiatives must be considered, wherever 
feasible.  
For years, the uniformed military has had career progression programs whereby 
one could plan a career along several tracks.  Almost twenty years ago, this allowed 
Soldiers to track as either operations or acquisition corps, based on their preferences.  The 
same type of system for managing the civilian part of the workforce has yet to be 
developed to the same level. This will include not only developing the career path 
possibilities for all acquisition employees, but also the professional development and 
educational opportunities that can be expected over the course of a successful career in 
the Army acquisition workforce.   
We must also work to leverage a competitive advantage that the Army has over 
all competitors.  As we move closer to realizing the DoD and Army acquisition vision of 
defeating any enemy on the battlefield, an overarching objective must be to instill the 
belief that there is no greater sense of satisfaction than serving in acquisition 
organizations that help protect the Nation and its people, as well as personally supporting 
our Warfighters.  We must continue to invest in the well-being of the force, by 
developing pride in the extraordinary service federal workers are providing. 
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4. Fostering of Diversity 
As the workforce is comprised of several different generations who are motivated 
by different factors across different preferred work environments, leadership must be 
cognizant of these dynamics throughout their organizations.   Fostering diversity through 
practices and strategies aligned to each generation will enable the Army acquisition 
workforce to better attain its goals.   
Therefore, to address baby boomer retirement concerns and to keep and attract 
high-performing employees at all levels, we need to offer quality-of-life initiatives that 
compare favorably with industry counterparts.  In this regard, we must continue to 
emphasize and augment the competitive advantage that the federal workforce has and in 
particular the acquisition workforce.  Few commercial businesses today have retirement 
plans that can compare to that offered by the federal government.  Additionally, once an 
acquisition professional retires, the experiences gleaned from years of service in a 
challenging environment make this individual all the more attractive to industry.     
Attracting good entry-level personnel is vital to the survival of the acquisition 
workforce.   We must also develop recruitment plans that seek to highlight and speak to 
the very issues that are of concern to this entry level workforce including paying off 
student loans, internships and educational opportunities, and opportunities for 
professional advancement.   
5. Global and International Trends 
We must recognize and act as though the acquisition personnel are an 
international workforce.  Since the end of the Cold War, the acquisition workforce has 
been called upon to deploy in ways very similar to that of the uniformed military.  The 
old acquisition workforce was largely responsible for interfacing with industry for the 
fielding of weapons systems, major end items and parts.  However, today’s acquisition 
professional must be ready, willing and able to deploy to remote locations around the 




prepared the workforce in this way and therefore have relied on individual resiliency 
rather than training, education, experience and incentives to develop our personnel – this 
must change. 
Just as the military is exposed to language and cultural sensitivity training, so too 
must we make the investment in language and cultural training for those members of the 
acquisition workforce that we expect will have regular interface with international 
commercial entities, personnel and governments. 
We also know that many of those foreigners educated in U.S. universities are 
returning to their countries.  We should look for ways to work with these well-trained 
individuals in international settings should we be deployed in regions and countries 
where these personnel are living and working.    
E. SUMMARY 
The “New” Organization offers an important framework for examining the future 
acquisition workforce.  It is one that has gained a degree of acceptance and progresses the 
notion of transformation to a modern workforce.   
This analysis has focused on the civilian personnel within the Army acquisition 
workforce, a population of over 45,000 personnel.  No attempt was made to make 
recommendations for the military portion of the workforce, although we recognize that 
the civilian and military components would need to be harmonized.   
We strongly believe that a greater reliance on networks, application of flatter 
(leaner) hierarchy, incorporation of flexible practices, fostering of diversity, and more 
sensitivity and capabilities for global and international efforts will result in a more 
capable acquisition workforce for supporting the Army and the Warfighter.  
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APPENDIX: DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE – HUMAN 
CAPITAL FACT SHEET 
This power point chart was obtained from a briefing given for the Human Capital Initiatives; Defense 
Acquisition University entitled Defense Acquisition Workforce – Human Capital Update for BCEFM FIPT 
on November 13, 2008.  
https://acc.dau.mil/GetAttachment.aspx?id=247304&pname=PresentationOtherFile&aid=39274&lang=en-
US.  Accessed April 21, 2009. 
 








FY07 Workforce Size 111,797 14,232 126,033*
FY13 Planned/Budgeted Size 112,294 15,245 127,539
Change in size 2001-2007 -2.5%
Change in size 2005-2007 -6% -8% -7%
Civilian/Military Composition 89% 11% 89%/11%
Educational Attainment
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 78% 85% 78%
Graduate Degree 29% 45% 31%
Certification (Cert)
Level I or Higher 68% 65% 68%
Level II or Higher 60% 42% 58%
Level III 36% 19% 34%
Position Cert Requirement Met 57% 45% 56%
Planning Considerations
% Baby Boomer/Silent Generations 73% 18%
Average Age 47.3 36.3 46.1
Workforce Life-Cycle Model 
% Future/Mid-Career/Senior 36/34/30(%)
Average Years of Service 18.5 13.5
Retirement Eligible (FY07) 20,012 (17.9%)






* There are 4 null records for Mil/Civ in the AT&L Workforce Data Mart
FY07 DAU Course Graduates (Classroom)
FY07 DAU Course Graduates (Web)
FY07 DAU Continuous Learning Module Completions
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